Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win by Moberly, Richard E.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
2007 
Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win 
Richard E. Moberly 
University of Nebraska, rmoberly2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Moberly, Richard E., "Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win" (2007). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 31. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/31 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF WHY SARBANES-OXLEY WHISTLEBLOWERS 
RARELY WIN 
Scholars praise the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of  2002 as one of the most protective anti-retaliation 
provisions in  the world. Yet, during its first three years, only 3.6% of 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial 
administrative process that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5% 
of whistleblowers won appeals through the process. This Article 
reports the results of a n  empirical study of all Department of Labor 
Sarbanes-Oxley determinations during this time, consisting of over 
700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and 
hearings. The results of this detailed analysis demonstrate that 
administrative decision makers strictly construed, and in  some cases 
misapplied, Sarbanes-Oxley's substantive protections to the 
significant disadvantage of  employees. These data-based findings 
assist in  identifying the provisions and procedures of the Act that do 
not work as Congress intended and suggest potential remedies for 
these statutory and administrative deficiencies. 
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UNFVLFILLED EXPECTATIONS 
Whistleblowers played a significant role in revealing and 
disrupting corporate malfeasance a t  the beginning of the twenty- 
first century, a s  scandals a t  corporations such as  Enron and 
WorldCom came to public light through the efforts of whistleblowing 
employees.' Subsequently, Congress recognized the importance of 
whistleblowing and included strong and unprecedented anti- 
retaliation protection for corporate employees a s  part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("the Act"), the mammoth congressional 
reaction to these corporate  scandal^.^ 
Yet, in the first three years after the statute's enactment, the 
Act failed to protect the vast majority of employees who filed 
Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims. During this time, 491 employees 
filed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints with the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), the agency charged with initially 
investigating such  complaint^.^ OSHA resolved 361 of these cases 
and found for employees only 13 times, a win rate of 3.6%.4 On 
appeal from 93 OSHA decisions, administrative law judges (ALJs) 
in the Department of Labor found in favor of 6 employees, a win 
rate of 6.5%.5 
This Article presents the findings of a n  empirical analysis of 
these Sarbanes-Oxley administrative decisions to explore why the 
Act's protections did not produce a robust number of employee 
victories. The results indicate that  employees rarely won claims for 
two primary reasons. First, OSHA and the ALJs generally decided 
cases as  a matter of law and rigidly construed Sarbanes-Oxley's 
legal requirements6 Second, for cases that  survived this strict legal 
scrutiny during the initial OSHA investigation, OSHA tended to 
1. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117-19, 1123-24 [hereinafter Moberly, Structural 
Model] (describing successful whistleblowing efforts). 
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002, 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A (Supp. IV 2004). 
3. See Table 3 infra. 
4.  See Table 1 infra. 
5. See Table 1 infra. 
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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misapply Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof regarding causation, to 
the substantial detriment of  employee^.^ 
These findings challenge the hope of scholars and whistleblower 
advocates that  Sarbanes-Oxley's legal boundaries and burden of 
proof would often result in favorable outcomes for whistleblowers. 
For example, soon after the Act's enactment, Professor Robert 
Vaughn asserted that the statute is "the most important whistle- 
blower protection law in the w ~ r l d . " ~  Tom Devine, legal director 
for the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower advo- 
cacy group, described the Act as  "the promised land .... [Tlhe law 
represents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech [that] far 
surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available for government work- 
e r ~ . " ~  Taxpayers Against Fraud called the statute "the single most 
effective measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron 
debacle and similar threats to the nation's financial markets."1° 
The language of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation protections 
justified this initial reaction. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, millions of 
workers were protected from retaliation for revealing corporate 
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
8. Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 105 (2005); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., 
WHISTLEBLOWERLAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES xii (2004) 
(labeling Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provision "the most systemic whistleblower 
protection framework enacted into federal lad'); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the 
Workplace in a n  Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (calling the 
provision the "gold standard" of whistleblower protection). But see Miriam A. Cherry, 
Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and  the Implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment LAW, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029,1034 (2004) (concluding that 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a 'Xalf-measure and not the true reform our securities laws need to 
respond to corporate fraud). The popular press also predicted the law would protect 
whistleblowers as never before. In 2002, Business Week stated that the Act "gives those who 
report corporate misconduct sweeping new legal protection .... IW]histleblowers are going to 
find life a bit easier." Paula Dwyer & Dan Carney, Year of the Whistleblower, BUS. WK., Dec. 
16, 2002, a t  106; see also id. ("Corporate managers had better brace themselves."). 
9. Blowing the Whistle on Corporate Wrongdoing: An Interview with Tom Devine, 23 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct./Nov. 2002, available a t  http://multinationalmonitor.org/ 
mm2002/02oct-novloct-nov02interviewdevine.html. Additionally, Gregory Watchman, the 
Executive Director of the Government Accountability Project, characterized the provisions as 
a "major breakthrough in establishing whistleblower rights." GREGORY R. WATCHMAN, 
SARBANES-OXLEY WHISTLEB~WERS: A NEW CORPORATE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM i , 8  (2004), 
h t t p : / / w w w . w h i s t l e b l o w e r . o r g / d o c / g a p l G ~  
10. S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t  10 (2002). 
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wrongdoing only sporadically, if a t  all." The Act now purports to 
protect these workers by providing significant remedies for re- 
taliation against corporate whistleblowers, including noneconomic 
damages and reinstatement.12 Moreover, the congressionally man- 
dated burden of proof for causation favors employees more than 
many retaliation protections.13 Indeed, a few early victories for 
employees sparked outrage from management attorneys, who 
argued that  Sarbanes-Oxley's protections were too broad and overly 
burdensome for employers14-a sign that  perhaps the Act provided 
real protections for whistleblowers. 
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's pro-whistleblower provisions and a 
few early employee victories, however, administrative decisions 
over the first three years of the Act's life failed to fulfill Congress's 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 42-46; Vaughn, supra note 8, a t  9-12. 
12. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(c) (Supp. IV 2004). 
13. To prove causation under Sarbanes-Oxley, employees must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of evidence that retaliation for engaging in protected activity was a 
"contributing factor" to their adverse employment action. See infra text accompanying notes 
62-64. To rebut a prima facie case, an employer must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of any protected 
employee activity. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64. Employees should have an easier 
time satisfying the "contributing factor" test than the "but for" causation test required by 
some other retaliation provisions, such as Title VII. See Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 
F.3d 601,608 (5th Cir. 2005). Conversely, the "clear and convincing" standard for employers 
should be more difficult than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard utilized elsewhere. 
See Vaughn, supra note 8, a t  77. 
14. See Cathleen Flahardy, SOX Gives DOL Power To Reinstate Whistleblowers: 
Employers Struggle To Defend Themselves Against Wrongful Termination Claims, CORP. 
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, a t  24, available a t  http://www.insidecounsel.com/issuesl 
insidecounseUl5~165/labor/85-l.html (stating that one ALJ employee win demonstrates'%ow 
difficult i t  will be for companies to prove their cases in whistleblower suits under SOX'); Mary 
E. Pivec, Whistleblower Protection Pitfalls: Innocent Companies Are Drained in Defending 
Adverse-Action Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, a t  28; Michael Starr & Adam J. Heft, 
Whistleblower Protections and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, a t  12 
(discussing three early AW decisions in favor of the employee and concluding that "[biased 
on these [early] decisions, SOX may reach a broader range of conduct and provide a more 
potent array of remedies than most employers had anticipated"). Two management attorney 
commentators concluded that one ALJ decision in favor of an  employee "looms as a foreboding 
omnipresence to employers who were hoping for a restrictive interpretation" of Sarbanes- 
Oxley. Id. a t  14; see also John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Note: Whistler's Nocturne 
in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision 
Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMF'. L.J. 235, 267 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley's 
whistleblowers have an easier time gaining protection than do employees under other 
whistleblower acts .... [Wlhat remains to be seen is whether the employer has been placed in 
too vulnerable a position."). 
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expectation that a strong anti-retaliation provision would protect 
whistleblowers. This Article explains why. 
Part I of the Article provides a brief summary of Sarbanes-Oxley's 
substantive and procedural requirements. Part I1 summarizes the 
scope and methodology of my empirical study examining why 
employees rarely won Sarbanes-Oxley cases. This study examined 
all Department of Labor Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed and resolved 
during the first three years of Sarbanes-Oxley's existence, totaling 
over 700 separate decisions from two levels of administrative 
investigations and hearings. As explained in Part  11, the scope of 
this study differs from previous empirical studies of employment 
cases in two fundamental ways. First, rather than rely only on 
published decisions to comprise a sample of examined cases,15 this 
study collected all administrative decisions involving Sarbanes- 
Oxley's anti-retaliation provision. Data from this census of cases 
allow stronger inferences than data derived from a sample of 
published cases.16 Second, some previous employment law studies 
relied upon data collected by the government; although such 
datasets contain a large number of cases, analyses usually produce 
only general outcome or procedural data about each case.17 By 
contrast, this study involved in-depth coding of decisions to obtain 
detailed data that permitted nuanced analyses of the rationales 
provided by decision makers in their determinations.18 The breadth 
of data produced by a census of cases and the depth of data resulting 
from the coding process permitted a truly comprehensive analysis 
of Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative decisions. 
15. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabi1itiesAct:A Windfall for Defendants, 
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall]; Ruth Colker, 
Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244 
(2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning]; Ann Juliano & Stewart J .  Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL . REV. 548, 556 (2001); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Verdicts Matter An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful 
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 511, 532 (2003); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in 
Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 897-99 (2006). 
16. See discussion infra Part 11. 
17. See, e.g., Kevin M .  Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 429-30 (2004); Laura Beth 
Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663,687-701. 
18. See discussion infra Part 11. 
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Part  I11 of the Article presents the study's results. The first 
section describes the low employee win rate a t  the two different 
levels of administrative review-the initial investigation conducted 
by OSHA and any subsequent hearing before a n  ALJ. The second 
section analyzes the rationales OSHA and the ALJs provided when 
finding for the employer and examines whether the employee lost 
because (1) the employee violated a "procedural" rule, such as  the 
statute of limitations; (2) the employee's claim failed as  a matter of 
law for not fitting within Sarbanes-Oxley's legal "boundaries"; or (3) 
the decision maker determined that  the facts did not demonstrate 
"causation," meaning that the employee's whistleblowing did not 
actually cause any adverse employment action.lg 
The analysis in Part  I11 provides two explanations for Sarbanes- 
Oxley's low employee win rate. First, employees frequently lost 
because OSHA and the ALJs determined that  a large number of 
employees either violated a procedural rule or did not meet 
Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory requirements as  a matter of law (that 
is, the employees did not demonstrate that  their claim fit within 
the Act's legal "boundaries"). Thus, OSHA and the ALJs rejected a 
large percentage of cases (66.7% for OSHA, 95.2% for ALJs) for 
failing to fit within the legal parameters of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
claim, thereby avoiding any determination of the factual merits of 
an  employee's  allegation^.^' In so doing, these administrative 
decision makers often strictly interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley's legal 
requirements. For example, whistleblowers rarely were equitably 
excused for missing a procedural deadline, such as the statute of 
 limitation^.^^ Moreover, although Sarbanes-Oxley applies to a "con- 
tractor, subcontractor, or agent"22 of any publicly-traded company, 
ALJs consistently determined that  the Act did not protect employees 
of privately-held subsidiaries and contractors of publicly-traded 
companies.23 Furthermore, U s  and the Administrative Review 
Board (ARB) (the last level of administrative review) required 
extraordinary specificity from whistleblowers regarding their 
19. See discussion infra Part 1II.B. 
20. See discussion infra Part III.B.l. 
21. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
22. 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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disclosure of illegal activity and refused to protect whistleblowers 
who disclosed general fraud as  opposed to fraud related specifically 
to ~ecu r i t i e s .~~  
This strict legal scrutiny might have many causes; I posit that  it 
likely resulted from the push and pull of defining a new statute's 
legal boundaries. Employees, perhaps relying on expectations 
generated by scholars and whistleblower advocates, brought claims 
that  tested the boundaries of this new statute. Administrative 
decision makers responded by interpreting potentially ambiguous 
provisions of the statute narrowly. 
Second, the low employee win rate also resulted from OSHA's 
tendency to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof for the few 
cases that  survived the agency's strict legal scrutiny. Despite a 
burden of proof for causation that  clearly favors employees, OSHA 
decided in favor of the employee in only 10.7% of the cases in which 
it evaluated the causation element of a n  employee's allegations 
(meaning cases in which a decision maker determined that the 
case fell within the legal "boundaries" of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim).25 
By contrast, when ALJs adjudicated causation, employees won 
55.6% of the time.26 I suggest that  OSHA's regulations and budget- 
ary restraints contributed to its failure to apply Sarbanes-Oxley's 
burden of proof appropriately. 
In Part IV, based on the findings of this study, I offer suggestions 
for statutory changes and interpretations that  would better reflect 
Congress's goals of protecting whistleblowers and remedying 
retaliation. First, fully one-third of all employees who lost a t  the 
ALJ Level and 18% who lost a t  the OSHA Level lost because the 
employee failed to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's short 90-day statute of 
 limitation^.^^ Because this procedural issue has little to do with the 
substantive merits of the whistleblower's claim, I suggest extending 
this statute of limitations to a minimum of 180 days.28 This 
extension will make the Act's limitations period similar to those 
found in equivalent whistleblower protection statutes and also 
24. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.-W.B. 
25. See Table 8 infra. 
26. See Table 8 infra. 
27. See Table 4 infra. 
28. See discussion infra Part 1V.A. 
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should provide a more reasonable period of time for whistleblowers 
to file complaints. 
Second, the Act's legal "boundaries" should be clarified. When 
OSHA and the ALJs interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory bound- 
aries, these administrative decision makers strictly examined two 
areas in particular: whether the respondent was a "covered em- 
ployer" and whether the employee engaged in  "protected a~tivity."~' 
Part  N recommends statutory changes that  could be implemented 
to clarify Congress's intent for broad whistleblower protections in 
the face of this overly-rigid administrative ~crut iny.~ '  For example, 
Congress should clarify that employees of certain privately-held 
companies are protected from retaliation when they report fraud a t  
publicly-traded corporations. Moreover, Congress should amend the 
Act to explicitly overrule administrative decisions that  require a 
whistleblower disclosure to relate to securities fraud, as  opposed to 
general fraud, and decisions that  fail to protect employees who 
refuse to engage in illegal activity. I also suggest that  OSHA and the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges publicize and disseminate 
certain statistical and substantive information about Sarbanes- 
Oxley cases in order to further clarify their interpretations of the 
Act's legal protections and to moderate any bias toward a particular 
party. 
Third, the Act's employee-friendly burden of proof regarding 
causation needs to be revitalized by altering OSHA's investigative 
procedures and providing OSHA more investigative  resource^.^^ 
As a n  alternative, I suggest removing OSHA from its current 
investigative role and replacing OSHA's process with one of three 
substitutes: (1) permitting whistleblowers to file claims directly in 
federal court; (2) beginning the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative 
process with hearings before a n  ALJ rather than with a n  OSHA 
investigation; or (3) assigning OSHA's investigative responsibilities 
to another agency, such as  the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).32 Any of these options could address OSHA's current 
misapplication of the Act's burden of proof scheme. 
29. See discussion infra Part N.B. 
30. See discussion infra Part N.B. 
31. See discussion infra Part N . C .  
32. See discussion infra Part N.C. 
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In  the last section of Part  IVY I suggest that  further research 
needs to examine whether Sarbanes-Oxley's failures should lead 
Congress to enact broader whistleblower protections.33 For example, 
Sarbanes-Oxley currently applies only to employees of publicly- 
traded corporations. To avoid the difficult line-drawing issues 
detailed in the results of this study, a broader whistleblower 
provision could apply to employers with a specific number of 
employees, which would clarify the Act's applicability by importing 
a well-known standard from other employee protection statutes. 
Furthermore, the Act currently protects only employees who 
disclose illegalities related to six specific areas of federal law. 
Providing statutory protections for whistleblowers who report any 
unlawful activity by their employer would clarify the extent of 
protections available to employees. These points are mentioned but 
not fully explored here because further research is necessary to 
analyze whether these benefits outweigh the  potential costs of such 
broader protections. 
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley failed to fulfill the great expectations 
generated by the Act's purportedly strong anti-retaliation pro- 
tections. Examining the reasons for this failure can provide insight 
to improve the Act. Specifically, the results suggest an  urgent need 
for a legislative and administrative reevaluation of Sarbanes- 
Oxley's anti-retaliation provision. The underenforcement of this 
provision undermines Congress's policy goal of deterring corporate 
fraud and leaves literally millions of private sector employees 
vulnerable to retaliation. Moreover, the study's findings can provide 
general lessons for the drafters of future whistleblower protection 
efforts and should serve a s  a reminder of the difficulty of transfer- 
ring the idealistic legislative goal of broad employee protection into 
realistic rights and attainable remedies. 
In  congressional hearings investigating the stunning collapse of 
Enron in 2002, whistleblower Sherron Watkins revealed crucial 
33. See discussion infra Part N.D. 
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details regarding Enron's fraudulent a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  In  later hearings 
regarding WorldCom's subsequent collapse, testimony from 
WorldCom officers demonstrated that  a n  internal auditor named 
Cynthia Cooper discovered the massive fraud orchestrated by the 
company's chief financial officer and reported it to the board of 
d i r e ~ t o r s . ~ ~  Given the importance of such employee disclosures, 
Congress considered it necessary to break the "corporate code of 
silence" tha t  discouraged potential whistleblowers from coming 
forward.36 Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley contains several provisions 
aimed a t  encouraging employees to disclose information about 
corporate wrongdoing. 
First, and most p r ~ m i n e n t l y , ~ ~  Congress created an  anti-retalia- 
tion provision to protect whistleblowers from adverse employment 
actions.38 Second, Sarbanes-Oxley also contains criminal penalties 
for individuals who retaliate against employees who "blow the 
whistle" to law enforcement authorities about violations of federal 
law.39 Third, the Act requires that  corporations create a whistle- 
blower disclosure channel for employees to report misconduct 
anonymously to the corporate board of  director^.^' Finally, the Act 
requires attorneys to report evidence of material securities law 
34. See The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14-66 
(2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins). 
35. See Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Serus., 107th Cong. 129 (2002) (statement of John W.  Sidgmore, President & 
CEO, WorldCom, Inc.). 
36. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4-5 (2002). 
37. Wi th  regard to whistleblower encouragement, academic and public attention has 
focused primarily on Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provisions. See, e.g., KOHN ET AL., 
supra note 8; Leonard M .  Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An  Analysis of Corporate 
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 875 (2002); Cherry, supra note 8; Vaughn, supra note 8; Ashlea Ebeling, 
Blowing the Sarbanes-&ley Whistle, FORBES.COM (June 18, 2003), http://www.forbes.com/ 
2003/06/18/cx~ae~0618beltwaygrint.html. 
38. The anti-retaliation provision is Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act, which was included as Title VIII of  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f  2002 8 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004). 
39. See id. 3 1107, 18 U.S.C. 8 1513(e) (Supp. IV 2004). 
40. See id. 8 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 2004); seegenerally Moberly, supra 
note 1 (analyzing this provision as a method of encouraging whistleblowers). 
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violations to corporate officers or the board of  director^.^^ This 
Article focuses on Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision. 
A. The Anti-retaliation Protections of the Act 
Congress viewed the anti-retaliation protections as  particularly 
important because, a t  the time, federal and state laws failed to 
protect employees consistently if they reported corporate malfea- 
sance. Rather, corporate whistleblowers were "subject to the patch- 
work and vagaries of current state laws, although most publicly 
traded companies do business n a t i ~ n w i d e . " ~ ~  Prior to Sarbanes- 
Oxley, protections for whistleblowers varied by the state in which 
the employee worked43 and the type of retaliation the employee 
endured.44 Federal law protected only whistleblowers who reported 
certain types of violations in certain i n d u ~ t r i e s . ~ ~  Thus, employees 
had difficulty predicting whether they would be protected from 
retaliation as  a result of reporting wrongdoing. Needless to say, this 
difficulty discouraged employees from consistently coming forward 
with i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~  
The protections of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision 
purport to address some of these problems. First, to address the 
"patchwork of state laws, Sarbanes-Oxley applies nationally to 
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 3 307, 15 U.S.C. 3 7245(1) (Supp. W 2004). 
42. S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t  10 (2002). 
43. States vary widely in the type of protections they provide. Some states, like Georgia, 
provide little protection to employee whistleblowers. See GA. CODE ANN. 3 34-7-1 (2005) (at- 
will employment provision); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51,52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) 
(finding that Georgia's employment-at-will statute permitted employer to fire employee 
because employee was about to uncover criminal activities). Others, like New Jersey, have 
broad statutes protecting any whistleblower who reports any violation of law. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 3 34:19-3 (West 2006). As Congress noted, "a whistleblowing employee in one state may 
be far more vulnerable to retaliation than a fellow employee in another state who takes the 
same actions." S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t  10 (2002). 
44. Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and do not address other 
forms of retaliation. See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (limiting 
retaliation suit to cases in which employee was actually or constructively discharged). 
45. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 79- 
80 (2001); MARCIA P. MICELI &JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 233-34 (1992). 
46. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 286 (1983). 
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employees of all publicly-traded ~ompanies .~ '  The Act's coverage 
extends beyond a particular industry and reaches all companies that  
issue publicly-traded shares.48 
Second, to correct the lack of protection for employees who report 
the type of securities fraud and accounting irregularities that led 
to the corporate scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley specifically protects 
employees who engage in protected activity related to fraud. To be 
protected, the subject matter of the whistleblower's report must 
relate to violations of one of six different types of laws, many of 
which are related to securities or accounting fraud.49 The breadth of 
protected activity related to that topic actually could be quite 
expan~ive. '~ Employees are protected if they "provide information, 
cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in a n  investi- 
gation regarding" such  violation^.^' Further, the whistleblower 
does not need to report a n  actual violation of the law; rather, the 
employee must "reasonably believe" that  a violation occurred.52 
The employee can provide information to any one of numerous 
recipients: a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any 
member of any committee of Congress; or a person with "supervisory 
authority" over the whi~tleblower.'~ The Act protects a whistleblow- 
er  who "file[s], cause[s] to be filed, testiflies], participate[s] in, or 
47. 18 U.S.C. 9 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
48. The Act applies to any "company with a class of securities registered under section 12 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 5 781), or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. $ 780(d))." 18 U.S.C. 8 
1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). The Act also applies to any "officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company." See id. 
49. The statute protects activity related to violations of sections 1341 (mail fraud); 1343 
(wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1348 (securities fraud) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, or 
"any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of 
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders." 18 U.S.C. 3 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004); 
see also id. $ (a)(2). 
50. See Vaughn, supra note 8, a t  22-50 (discussing broad readings of Sarbanes-Oxley's 
statutory language); see also discussion infra Part IV.B (supporting a broad reading of this 
language). 
51. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004). 
52. See id. This standard is more protective of employees than other caselaw and statutes 
that require a whistleblowing employee to be correct in their disclosure of illegal activity. See, 
e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1992); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996). 
53. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a)(l)(C) (Supp. IV 2004). 
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otherwise assist[s] in a proceeding" related to violations of the same 
laws and  regulation^.^^ 
Finally, the remedies for a violation of the Act seem appropriately 
set to discourage retaliation. OSHA may immediately reinstate a 
whistleblower if an  initial OSHA investigation finds reasonable 
cause to believe retaliation occurred.55 In  addition to the standard 
back pay award, whistleblowers also could receive special damages 
including attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and expert witness fees.56 
B. The Procedure for Filing a Whistleblower Complaint 
Congress specifically incorporated into Sarbanes-Oxley the 
procedural rules of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and 
Reform Act for the 21st C e n t ~ r y , ~ '  also known as  "AIR21," which 
provides whistleblower protection for employees who report 
airline safety problems.58 Consequently, Congress charged OSHA 
with the responsibility for investigating Sarbanes-Oxley whistle- 
blower  complaint^.^^ Subsequent to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
OSHA issued specific regulations that detail the procedure for such 
54. Id. $ 1514A(a)(2). 
55. See id. $ 1514A(c)(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. $ 1980.105(a)(l) (2006); see also Vaughn, supra note 
8, a t  97 11.400 (noting benefits of reinstatement a s  a remedy). 
56. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(c)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. IV 2004); see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 
8, a t  11 1 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery 
of attorney fees a s  part of "special damages" that must be awarded, as opposed to part of a fee- 
shifting scheme that gives courts discretion to deny the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees 
to an employee). 
57. Pub. L. No. 106-181, $ 519(b), 114 Stat. 61, 146-47 (2000) (codified in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
58. See id. $519,114 Stat. a t  145; 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing 
that, with few exceptions, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower actions "shall be governed under the 
rules and procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code"). 
59. Commentators initially questioned whether OSHA, an agency mainly responsible for 
workplace safety, could adequately investigate claims involving "complex matters of corporate 
securities laws and other financial and accountancy laws and practices." Procedures for the 
Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal 
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 
52,104 (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Procedures]; see also Cherry, supra note 8, a t  1083 n.383 
(questioning the choice of OSHA as Sarbanes-Oxley investigative agency). OSHA defended 
the choice by noting that i t  administers thirteen other whistleblower statutes, all of which 
involve protecting whistleblowers. See Procedures a t  52,104-05. 
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whistleblower claims and that, for the most part, mirror AIR2l's 
 procedure^.^^ 
After a n  employee files a complaint with OSHA, the agency 
informs the named respondents and the SEC of the a l l ega t i~n .~ '  
OSHA will dismiss the complaint without any investigation under 
two conditions. First, OSHA will dismiss complaints that  do not 
make a prima facie showing of retaliation that: (1) the employee 
engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew about the 
activity; (3) the employee suffered an  unfavorable personnel action; 
and (4) the "circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that  
the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable 
action."62 Second, if a n  inference of retaliation can be drawn, then 
OSHA will dismiss a complaint if the employer demonstrates by 
clear and convincing evidence that  the adverse employment action 
would have been taken regardless of the protected activity.63 The 
employer has twenty days from receiving notice of the complaint to 
provide statements or documents presenting its position.64 
If a n  employee presents a prima facie case and the employer fails 
to meet its clear and convincing burden of proof, then OSHA will 
conduct a n  i nve~ t iga t i on .~~  The regulations require OSHA to issue 
written findings from the investigation within sixty days of the 
filing of the complaint regarding whether it finds reasonable cause 
to believe that  retaliation in violation of the Act occurred.66 OSHA 
makes this determination using the same burden of proof scheme a s  
with its initial preinvestigation decision.67 
Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof is employee-friendly for two 
reasons. First, the Act adopted the "contributing factor" test for 
60. See generally Procedures, supra note 59, at 52,104-17. 
61. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(a) (2006). The regulations delegate the authority to 
investigate and issue determinations regarding Sarbanes-Oxley claims to OSHA's Assistant 
Secretary. See Secretary's Order 5-2002,67 Fed. Reg. 65,008 (Oct. 22,2002). In the following 
description of Sarbanes-Oxley's procedural regulations, I use the convenient (and intuitive) 
term "OSHA" rather than "Assistant Secretary," which is used by the regulations, because the 
Assistant Secretary is acting on behalf of the agency. 
62. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(b)(l) (2006). 
63. See id. 5 1980.104(c). 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 5 1980.104(d). 
66. See id. 5 1980.105. 
67. See id. 
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cau~ation.~ '  To be a contributing factor, the protected activity must 
simply be one factor, "alone or in combination with other factors," 
that  "tends to affect in any way the outcome of the de~ision."~' 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers can satisfy this burden of proof more 
easily than employees under many other employment provisions. 
The "contributing factor" causation test demands less evidence than 
the "causal" language required for Title VII retaliation cases7' and 
perhaps even less than the "motivating factor" language utilized in 
Title VII "mixed-motive" cases7' As stated by the ARB in a 
Sarbanes-Oxley case, this test is specifically "intended to overrule 
existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that  his 
protected conduct was a significant, motivating, substantial, or 
predominant factor in a personnel action in  order to overturn that  
a~tion." '~ In implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, the 
Department of Labor also recognized the "contributing factor" test 
a s  less onerous for a n  employee to satisfy than other causation 
tests.73 
68. See 18 U.S.C. 3 1514A(b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 2004) (adopting the burden of proof standard 
from AIR21,49 U.S.C. 5 42121(b)); 49 U.S.C. $42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000); 29 C.F.R. 1 1980.104 
(2006). 
69. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, a t  18 (ARB May 31, 
2006) (quoting Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
70. See, e.g., Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601,608 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The proper 
standard of proof on the causation element of a Title VII retaliation claim is that the adverse 
employment action taken against the plaintiff would not have occurred 'but for' her protected 
conduct."). 
71. In its explanation of this provision, OSHA noted that: 
The "contributing factor" language used in this section is identical to that used 
in the employee protection provisions of the ERA and AIR21, under which there 
is sufficient case law interpreting the phrase. For example, in Kester v. Carolina 
Power & Light Co., No. 02-007,2003 WL 22312696, * 8 (Adm. Rev. Bd. Sept. 30, 
2003), the ARB noted: "[Plrior to the 1992 amendments, the ERA complainant 
was required to prove that protected activity was a 'motivating factor' in the 
employer's decision. Congress adopted the less onerous 'contributing factor' 
standard 'in order to facilitate relief for employees who have been retaliated 
against for exercising their [whistleblower rights].' 138 Cong. Rec. No. 142 (Oct. 
5, 1992). 
Procedures, supra note 59, a t  52,107. 
72. See Klopfenstein, No. 04-149, a t  18 (quoting Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 
1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73. See Procedures, supra note 59, a t  52,107. 
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Second, after establishing causation and the other prerequisites 
of the prima facie case, the employee should win unless the em- 
ployer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision 
absent any protected activity. Significantly, the employer's burden 
must be satisfied under the "clear and convincing" standard,74 which 
requires a higher level of proof than the typical "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard utilized by other anti-retaliation statutes.75 
The U.S. Supreme Court described the level of proof needed to 
satisfy this standard as  "highly pr~bable"~~-a rigorous standard for 
employers to satisfy.77 
After applying these standards of proof, if OSHA finds reasonable 
cause to believe that  a violation occurred, then OSHA "shall" issue 
a preliminary order of relief to the employee.78 This order "shall" 
include 
all relief necessary to make the employee whole, including, 
where appropriate: reinstatement with the same seniority status 
that the employee would have had but for the discrimination; 
back pay with interest; and compensation for any special 
damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including 
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney's 
fees." 
OSHA may order reinstatement to begin immediately, even if the 
employer requests further review of the order.80 Although such 
orders appear mandatory given the use of the term "shall," the 
regulations provide that  reinstatement may not be appropriate if 
74. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, a t  10 ( A U  Mar. 4, 2004); Welch v. Cardinal 
Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15, a t  44 ( A U  Aug. 1,2003); see also Vaughn, supra note 8, a t  
77. 
75. See Halloum, 2003-SOX-7, a t  10; Welch, 2003-SOX-15, a t  47; see also Vaughn, supra 
note 8, a t  77. 
76. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310,316 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, a t  62. 
77. See Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing under the same statutory framework found in the Energy Reorganization Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 5851, that "[flor employers, this is a tough standard"). 
78. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.105(a)(l) (2006). 
79. Id. 
80. See id. § 1980.105(c). 
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the employer demonstrates that the employee is a "security risk."" 
Of course, if reasonable cause is not found, then OSHA simply will 
notify the parties of that finding.82 
The parties have thirty days to request further review from an 
administrative law judge; otherwise, OSHA's initial findings and 
order will become the final order of the Department of Labor.83 If a 
hearing is requested, an ALJ conducts a de novo hearing regarding 
the c ~ m p l a i n t . ~ ~  U s  have broad discretion regarding the extent of 
discovery permitted and the type of evidence allowed.85 
Appeals from an  AU decision must be made within ten days of 
the decision to the Department of Labor's Administrative Review 
B ~ a r d . ' ~  The ARB has discretion to take the case for review; if it 
has not done so within thirty days of the decision, the ALJ's decision 
will become the final determination of the agency.87 If the ARB 
chooses to review the ALJ's determination, it must apply a "sub- 
stantial evidence" standard and must issue a final decision within 
120 days of the conclusion of the AU hearing.88 Appeals from an 
ARB decision are made to a federal circuit court of appeals.89 
Finally, the Act gives whistleblowers the option of filing a claim 
in federal court. Sarbanes-Oxley permits employees-not employ- 
ers-to remove the case to federal district court if the Department 
of Labor does not completely resolve a complaint within 180 days, 
including a decision by the ARB if a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  This option almost 
certainly will be available for employees, because it is unlikely that 
the entire process will be completed in that period of time; in Fiscal 
Year 2005, an  initial OSHA investigation itself took an average of 
127 days to ~omplete.~' 
81. Id. 5 1980.105(a)(l). 
82. See id. 3 1980.105(a)(2). 
83. See id. 5 1980.106. 
84. See id. 5 1980.107(b). 
85. See id. 5 1980.107(d). 
86. See id. 5 1980.110. 
87. See id. § 1980.110(b). 
88. See id. 5 1980.110(b)-(c). 
89. See id. 5 1980.112(a). 
90. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 2004). 
91. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Feb. 15,2006) (on file with author). This time period has grown significantly longer since the 
enactment of OSHA; in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
investigation was 92 days. See id.; see also Allen v. Stewart Enter., No. 05-059, at 3 n.5 (ARB 
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As written, Sarbanes-Oxley appears to provide strong substan- 
tive and procedural protections for whistleblowers. The Act includes 
favorable provisions for whistleblowers to file claims easily, to 
benefit from a favorable burden of proof, to obtain immediate 
reinstatement, and to file in federal court if desired. Why, then, did 
so few employees win during the first three years of the Act's 
existence? The purpose of the present study is to analyze OSHA and 
ALJ decisions empirically to discover patterns of decision making 
that, a t  least in part, answer this question. 
This section summarizes the study's me thod~ logy ,~~  which differs 
from previous empirical studies of employment law decisions in 
areas such as  sexual ha ra~sment , '~  the Americans with Disabilities 
race d i s~r imina t ion ,~~  general employment discrimination 
cases in federal court,96 and California jury verdicts in employ- 
ment discrimination and wrongful discharge cases.97 These 
studies obtained their data either by examining published judicial 
decisionsg8 (the 'Westlaw" approach) or by utilizing a n  outcome 
database managed by a federal agencyg9 (the "Database" approach). 
Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg describe these 
Aug. 17,2005) (noting that employees dismissed their appeal in order to file in federal district 
court and stating that "[als is the usual case, the 180-day period for deciding the case had 
expired before the [employees] filed their petition with the Board"). 
92. A more detailed description of the study's methodology can be found on the web. 
See Richard E. Moberly, Methodology of Empirical Study for Unfilled Expectations Article, 
http://www.wm.ed~aw/publicationsfla~eviewId0~umentdmethodo10gy.pdf (last visited Sept. 
22, 2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Methodology]. 
93. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t  549-50. 
94. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, a t  103-04; Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t  244. 
95. See Parker, supra note 15, a t  893. 
96. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t  429; Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, a t  
664. 
97. See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, a t  538. 
98. See, e.g., Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, a t  103 (utilizing Westlaw to find published 
opinions); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t  244 (utilizing Westlaw to find published 
opinions); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t  556 (utilizing Westlaw and LexisNexis to find 
published opinions); Oppenheimer, supra note 15, a t  532 (utilizing California jury verdict 
reporters); Parker, supra note 15, a t  897-99 (utilizing Westlaw to find published opinions). 
99. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t  429-30 (utilizing Administrative Office 
data); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, a t  687-91 (utilizing EEOC statistics); id. a t  692-701 
(utilizing Administrative Office data). 
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methods as  the two most commonly employed of the three types of 
empirical legal studies currently being conducted.100 Professors 
Clermont and Eisenberg, however, reserve their highest praise for 
the third type of empirical study they identify-a study in which 
researchers gather their own dataset from original sources for 
subsequent statistical analysis.'0' The study presented in this 
Article follows this third and less-traveled path described by 
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg. Although more labor intensive, 
the third path offers significant advantages over the other two 
methods. 
A. Complete Census us. Sampling 
First, this study evaluates "broader" data than that  typically 
mined by the Westlaw approach. The Westlaw method can produce 
nuanced descriptive data if researchers follow social science 
methods of coding and analyzing the cases.lo2 However, the data 
come from a narrow pool of cases, because the cases available on a 
database such a s  Westlaw constitute a nonrepresentative frac- 
tion of the cases actually decided by agencies and courts.lo3 This 
well-documented "tip of the iceberg" limitation produces data with 
limited breadth, from which researchers can draw only limited 
inferences to the entire population of cases filed.''* 
By contrast, the study described in this Article addressed these 
limitations by examining all decisions issued by OSHA and the 
100. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 125-26 (2002). 
101. See id. at 126. 
102. See id. at 125-26; Parker, supra note 15, at 899-900 (describing methodology in  which 
research assistants coded opinions for 61 factors). 
103. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 125-26 (noting that "published decisions 
are a skewed sample" of all judicial decisions); Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, at 103-04 
(recognizing this limitation); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 246 (acknowledging the 
"selection bias" inherent in  examining appellate cases by searching Westlaw); Juliano & 
Schwab, supra note 15, at 557 (acknowledging that studying only published judicial opinions 
"may not be a random sample of all judicial decisions"). 
104. See Peter Siegelman & John J .  Donohue 111, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A 
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & 
Soc'YRw. 1133,1144 (1990) (warning researchers that published judicial opinions represent 
less than 15 percent of  employment discrimination complaints filed); see also Clermont & 
Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 125-26 (noting that when studying only published opinions, "it 
is tough to infer truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what lies below disputes"). 
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Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) under the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act. This dataset thus represents what social scientists call 
a "census," or an  entire population of cases-not merely a n  unrepre- 
sentative sample of cases. Analyzing a census resolves the "tip of 
the iceberg" problem that  inherently limits the inferential strength 
of data obtained only from a commercial database of published 
 decision^."^ Thus, this Article can draw stronger inferences from the 
broader dataset of a census than inferences drawn from a n  unrepre- 
sentative sample. 
B. Original Sources us. Secondary Compilations 
Second, this study evaluates "deeper" data than data available 
through the Database approach. The Database method typically 
produces data from a broad, comprehensive pool of cases, but the set 
of data itself is limited and narrow. For example, the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts maintains a database for all 
federal cases.lo6 Scholars generally regard the Administrative 
Office data as  reliable and valid1'' but recognize that  it provides 
limited data, typically about only procedural issues and outcomes.108 
By contrast, this study evaluated the original source of administra- 
tive Sarbanes-Oxley decisions: the written decisions themselves. 
Moreover, this study coded information contained in these decisions 
using rigorously applied social scientific methods, thus yielding 
105. Given that this study examines only cases actually filed under Sarbanes-Oxley, this 
study gives insight into a much greater part of the "iceberg" of disputes than the Westlaw 
approach. However, the study does not provide insight into the entire iceberg, that is, it does 
not consider disputes in which a case is settled, ignored or otherwise disposed of before a 
formal complaint is filed with OSHA. 
106. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t  429-30. 
107. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100, a t  127-29 (discussing the database's 
strengths and weaknesses). 
108. See id. a t  127 (noting that the forms used to compile the Administrative Office 
database include "data regarding the names of the parties, the subject-matter category and 
the jurisdictional basis of the case, the case's origin in the district a s  original or removed or 
transferred. the amount demanded. the dates of filing and termination in the district court 
- 
or the court of appeals, the procedural stage of the case a t  termination, the procedural method 
of disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached decision, the prevailing party and 
the relief granted); id. a t  128 (''[Yhe Administrative Office data do not contain many other 
things one would like to know. They show no particulars of each lawsuit.") (emphasis added); 
id. a t  129 (''More generally, the Administrative Office's data are just a bunch of codes about 
a limited number of case features."). 
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more nuanced, "deeper" data beyond simply procedural or outcome 
information. In  short, this study produced detailed and complex 
data, such a s  the types of factual allegations made by the whistle- 
blower and the rationales used by the decision maker--data that  are 
not analyzed in studies utilizing the Database method because such 
information is simply not available for analysis in the government- 
compiled databases.log Data gathered from original sources, a s  
employed in  this study, present a more intricate and thus complete 
picture of a set of claims and their resolutions than data obtained 
through the Database method.l1° 
Both the Westlaw method and the Database method have 
strengths and weaknesses. The method used in the research 
reported in this Article, however, retains the advantages of each of 
the other two methods while minimizing their corresponding 
disadvantages. In  sum, to determine why so few employees suc- 
ceeded in Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation cases, this study gathered 
original data that  were both broad-covering a census of cases-and 
deep-including descriptions of the important particulars of the 
cases. 
C. The Specifics 
This study examined decisions from the first two levels of 
Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative process: (1) the initial decision by 
109. OSHA does collect some data related to its Sarbanes-Oxley decisions; however, the 
data available to the public are generally limited to outcome data for each case, that is, 
whether the complainant or respondent won, or if the case was withdrawn or settled. With 
regard to the U s ,  on April 28, 2005, the OALJ stopped compiling statistics for Sarbanes- 
Oxley cases related to the type of disposition a t  the ALJ Level. See E-mail from Todd Smyth, 
Office of Administrative Law Judges, to author (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author). Before 
that date, the OALJ collected only outcome statistics, not the more complex data obtained by 
this study. See id. 
110. Of course, all studies have limitations. One limitation of relying on written decisions 
is that the data are derived from what OSHA investigators and U s  determine is important 
in a case. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t  558-59 (discussing this limitation). With 
this limitation in mind, strong inferences can still be drawn in this Article because my 
analysis focuses on the rationales provided by these decision makers, thus minimizing the 
study's limitation. Nonetheless, the limitation is important to consider when addressing a 
party's factual allegations, because these allegations are described through the lens of a 
decision maker justifying his or her result. See id. a t  559 (cautioning that a researcher using 
data derived from judicial decisions should be "sophisticated and somewhat tentative in the 
conclusions" drawn from such decisions). 
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OSHA, as  set forth in a decision letter sent to the parties from 
the Secretary of Labor (the "OSHA Level"); and (2) if the parties 
requested a hearing with an  administrative law judge, the decision 
published by the ALJ (the "ALJ Level"). The study included all 
OSHA Level decisions from the first Sarbanes-Oxley complaint filed 
on August 19, 2002, through complaints filed on July 13,2005 (470 
observations), a s  well a s  all decisions from the ALJ Level, from the 
effective date of the Act through June 1, 2006 (236 observations). 
This census of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions involved 491 complainants 
a t  the OSHA Level and 237 complainants a t  the ALJ Level."' 
The study was divided into two phases in which cases from each 
level (OSHA and ALJ) were analyzed and coded separately on Excel 
spreadsheets. The cases were coded for numerous variables: 134 
variables for OSHA decisions and 121 variables for AW opinions.l12 
Code books named, described, and exemplified each variable. When 
codes classified data, the code books enumerated and exemplified 
specific criteria for making a decision on the applicability of a 
~a r i ab l e . "~  
In general, each level of cases was coded for the following 
categories of variables: 
descriptive variables related to the employee, including gender, 
whether the employee was represented by an  attorney, and the 
employee's job title; 
variables describing the allegations made by the employee 
related to (1) the type of retaliation allegedly suffered by the 
employee; (2) the type of protected activity in which the 
111. The OSHA decisions were obtained from OSHA through a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request, while the ALJ decisions were obtained from the website of the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges. Each ALJ opinion in a Sarbanes-Oxley case is published a t  U.S. 
Dep't of Labor, http:l/www.oalj.dol.gov/LIBWHIST.htm (last visited Sept. 22,2007). 
112. A well-regarded study of published sexual harassment court opinions utilized a similar 
methodology for coding written opinions by decision makers, although the coding variables 
used in that study and this study obviously differ. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15,555- 
60. 
113. Coders used a ffity-nine-page code book to code the ALJ opinions. See Richard E. 
Moberly, Code Book: Empirical Study ofALJDecisions Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
httpdlwww. wm.ed~awlpublicationda~~eviewldocumentdaljcodebook.pdf a s  visited Sept. 
28,2007). They used a separate ffity-nine-page code book for the OSHA decisions. See Richard 
E. Moberly, Code Book: Empirical Study of OSHA Investigations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, http:l/www. wm.eddawlpublicationdawreviewldocuments1codebook.p (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
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employee claimed to have engaged; (3) the position of the 
person to whom the employee was alleged to have provided 
information regarding illegal activity; and (4) the type of illegal 
activity the employee claimed to have reported; 
outcome variables identifying whether the case ended in a win 
for the employee, a win for the employer, a withdrawal by the 
employee, a settlement, or was sent to arbitration; and 
variables related to the types of rationales and evidence utilized 
by the decision maker when deciding for either the employee or 
the employer. 
The variables were intended to be "objective," such that, as put by 
the authors of a previous study in another area of employment law, 
"well-trained legal professionals should reach the same answers in 
most cases."'14 
I randomly divided the OSHA and ALJ cases among the coders for 
coding. For OSHA cases, the selection of cases for each coder 
included the same randomly selected 52 cases (approximately 10% 
from each year) to check inter-coder reliability.l15 The coders had 
95.82% agreement for their coding of variables for these overlapping 
cases. The high agreement rate among coders indicates that  the 
coded results are reliable.l16 
For ALJ cases, the coders had 90.41% agreement for their coding 
of variables. After correcting for coder input errors and misunder- 
standing of the coding for two specific  variable^,^" the coders had 
93.97% agreement."' The remaining differences were interpretative, 
114. See Juliano & Schwab, supm note 15, at 558. The coders for the OSHA cases were two 
law students who completed their first year of study a t  a law school in the midwestern United 
States. The coders for the AU cases included the two OSHA coders, a recent graduate of that 
same law school, and the author. I gave the student coders specific instruction on the Act's 
legal requirements and trained them through repeated practice coding sessions. 
115. The coders did not know which cases were included among these overlapping 52 cases. 
116. See KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 143 (2002) ("It's 
clear from a review of the work on reliability that reliability coefficients of .90 or greater 
would be acceptable to all...."). 
117. These coding issues are addressed more thoroughly in the detailed description of the 
study's methodology, available online. See Moberly, Methodology, supra note 92. 
118. An inordinate amount of the differences between the coders occurred in the six cases 
in which the employee prevailed. Although these cases amounted to 2.54% of cases (6/236), 
coding differences on these cases totaled 23.55% of all the differences. Coders on these six 
cases had a n  agreement rate of 74.87%. The most likely explanation for such a disparity on 
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and these differences were resolved through discussion among the 
coders. The agreed-upon coding became the data used in the study. 
Again, given the high agreement rate and the discussion regarding 
the few differences, the coded results for the ALJ cases are also 
reliable.'lg 
Before statistical analyses, I matched OSHA decisions with any 
subsequent ALJ decision related to the OSHA complaint. I matched 
cases using employer named2' and synchronizing key variables, 
such as  filing dates, decision dates, and case numbers. After this 
process, 186 cases contained both OSHA and ALJ decisions. Forty- 
three cases (involving 44 employees) contained information only 
from ALJ opinions, while 305 cases contained information only from 
OSHA  decision^.'^^ Thus, the data contained information for 535 
employees who filed for relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. The final data 
spreadsheet contained 223 variables across the 535 employees, 
ultimately yielding 119,305 cells or d a t a ~ 0 i n t s . l ~ ~  
Researchers employ hypothesis-testing statistics with associated 
alpha levels to infer that  sample characteristics represent the 
population from which the sample was drawn with a specific 
probability of accuracy.123 In this study, no sampling occurred; 
instead, I analyzed a complete census of cases for the time period 
described above. Thus, I did not calculate and do not report 
these types of cases might be that these opinions are extraordinarily long. Except for one case 
in which a default judgment was entered, the opinions in the other five employee-win cases 
averaged 55 pages in length. The agreement rate for all cases other than the six employee-win 
cases was 95.71%. 
119. See NEUENDORF, supra note 116, a t  143. 
120. I was unable to use the employee's name a s  a means of matching cases because OSHA 
redacted information related to the identity of the employee when OSHA responded to the 
FOIA request. 
121. The 43 cases with only ALJ decisions were missing OSHA decisions for one of two 
reasons: either I could not reasonably link the ALJ case to an  OSHA case based upon the 
method discussed above, or the ALJ case was related to an  OSHA case filed after July 13, 
2005, the date of my FOIA request, and therefore would not be included in the documents 
produced by OSHA. Of the 305 OSHA decisions with no corresponding ALJ opinion, 129 either 
settled or withdrew a t  the OSHA Level, and therefore would not have any ALJ case associated 
with it. The balance of 176 cases either did not request a n  ALJ hearing or the ALJ decision 
had not been released by June 1,2006, the end date of the study. 
122. Copies of the spreadsheets used for statistical analyses are available from the author 
upon request. 
123. See BERNARD E. WHITNN, JR., PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 429- 
30 (2d ed. 2002). 
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statistical findings with alpha levels. Instead, I report exact 
statistical characteristics for the population of cases under study.lZ4 
I did not include ARB decisions in the study because only a small 
number of ARB opinions addressed legal or factual issues related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley. As of September 30, 2006, the ARB had issued 39 
Sarbanes-Oxley opinions involving review of 33 cases.lZ5 Of those 39 
opinions, only 13 addressed legal or factual issues related to 
Sarbanes-Oxley. The other opinions addressed ARB procedural 
policies or indicated that the case was either withdrawn or settled. 
Of course, ARB decisions substantively affect the administrative 
review process, a s  the ARB'S interpretation of the Act is binding on 
OSHA and the U s .  Accordingly, I will discuss the impact of a n  
ARB decision on a particular legal issue where appropriate. 
This Part  examines two types of results from the study. First, in 
order to contextualize the study's explanations for why so few 
employees won Sarbanes-Oxley claims, Section A provides a 
statistical "big picture" view of the outcomes for all Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases. Second, to explain the low employee win rate described in 
Section A, Section B examines the rationales used by OSHA and the 
ALJs when finding against the employee. In  this Section, I conclude 
that  employees rarely won because OSHA and the ALJs determined 
that  a large percentage of employees failed to prove a Sarbanes- 
Oxley claim as a matter of law, often by narrowly construing the 
Act's legal parameters. Moreover, for the cases that  survived this 
strict legal analysis, OSHA found that  a vast majority of employees 
failed to present sufficient facts to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's burden 
of proof with regard to causation. 
124. Cf. NEUENDORF, supra note 116, at 168 (arguing that content analysis to answer 
research questions regarding common occurrences or themes "would probably best be 
addressed with simple frequencies of occurrence and no test of statistical significance"). 
125. ARB cases are listed by date at USDOUOAU Reporter: Decisions of the 
Administrative Review Board by Date, http:/lwww.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIClARB/REFERENCESl 
CASELISTS/ARBINDEX.HTM (last visited Sept. 22,2007). 
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A. The Big Picture: Outcomes from the Administrative Process 
The win rates for employees and employers in cases that fully 
completed each stage of administrative review were remarkably 
one-sided. As Table 1 indicates, employees won 3.6% of the cases 
completed a t  the OSHA Level, and 6.5% of the cases completed a t  
the ALJ Level. 
Table 1: Win Rates for Cases that  Completed Each Level of 
Administrative Review 
NOTE: Table 1 reports the percentage of cases won by each party 
when OSHA or an ALJ made a determination for either the 
complainant-employee or the respondent-employer. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
Employee 
Win Rate 
Employer 
Win Rate 
Moreover, the win rate for employees a t  the OSHA Level appears 
to be decreasing over time. The win rate set forth in Table 1 does not 
include any OSHA cases filed after July 13, 2005, the end date of 
the OSHA part of the study. Yet, according to preliminary statistics 
released by OSHA for decisions through September 30, 2006, 
employees won 3.1% of the cases decided at the OSHA Level since 
Sarbanes-Oxley's e n a ~ t m e n t . ' ~ ~  No employee won in any of the 159 
cases OSHA resolved in Fiscal Year 2006, after the end of the 
study.''' 
Sarbanes-Oxley's low employee win rate, although surprising, 
appears even more disproportionate when compared to win rates for 
126. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author). 
127. See id. 
OSHA 
Level 
3.6% 
(1 3)8 
96.4% 
(348) 
ALJ Level 
6.5% 
(6) 
93.5% 
(87) 
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employees asserting claims under statutes other than Sarbanes- 
Oxley. Table 2, below, summarizes win rates for employees and 
plaintiffs raising claims in  a variety of administrative and judicial 
fora. 
As with the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates discussed thus far, the win 
rates set forth in Table 2 are for cases that  completed the adminis- 
trative or judicial process with a decision rendered for one of the 
parties; therefore, cases that  settled or were voluntarily withdrawn 
are not i n c 1 ~ d e d . l ~ ~  
128. I do not report the results of a test for statistical signiticance comparing the 
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2. Such a test would be inappropriate because the 
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2 are based on data gathered from diverse populations 
using different sampling techniques a t  divergent points in time. However, if win rates were 
approximately equal across employment cases and venues from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005, we 
would expect to see win rates that differed in only minor ways, regardless of the sampling 
techniques. Thus, although the win rates in Table 2 may not be statistically comparable, they 
provide interesting points of conceptual comparison and a contextual perspective for the 
Sarbanes-Oxley win rate discussed in this Article. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Win Rates for Various Types of Claims Resolved by 
Administrative Agencies and Federal Courts 
category. 
EEOC 
Casesc 
Court 
Casesd 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
Discrimination 
Disability Charges 
Religious 
Discrimination 
Sex-Based 
Charges 
Equal Pay Act 
Charges 
Sexual 
Harassment Cases 
Employment 
Cases 
All Non- Jobs 
Cases 
Torts and Con- 
tracts Cases 
(615) 
9.1% 
(2,972) 
10.6% 
(578) 
10.6% 
(5,343) 
13.7% 
(271) 
14.1% 
(3,255) 
13.0% 
52.9% 
62.4% 
(7,922) 
90.9% 
(29,837) 
89.4% 
(4,858) 
89.4% 
(44,840) 
86.3% 
(1,707) 
85.9% 
(19,775) 
87.0% 
47.1% 
37.6% 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley results are derived from this study's results.129 
OSHA provided the other statistics to the author for Fiscal Years 
2003-2005.lS0 AU statistics for other statutes are not available. 
'The EEOC statistics were compiled from statistics published on the 
EEOC's website for Fiscal Years 2003-2005.131 
The federal court statistics are from data collected by the federal 
government for cases filed in federal court from 1979-2000.132 
With the exception of whistleblowers under the Energy Reorgani- 
zation Act, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers succeeded at a lower rate 
than a broad range of employees and other plaintiffs, regardless of 
whether the employee brought a different statutory claim under 
OSHA's jurisdiction, in a process administered by an  agency other 
than OSHA, or as  a plaintiff in federal court. For example, even 
though Congress based Sarbanes-Oxley's protections upon the 
provisions of AIR21, airline industry whistleblowers succeeded a t  
more than twice the rate of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers (9.8%) 
in OSHA in~es t iga t i0ns . l~~  
Sarbanes-Oxley's low employee win rate should give pause. 
Almost without exception, both critics and supporters of employee 
rights acknowledge the employee-friendly nature of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
with a burden of proof clearly intended to enhance a whistleblower's 
129. See Table 1 supra. 
130. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Oct. 5,2006) (on file with author). 
131. See EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ 
enforcement.htm1 (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). The statistics include decisions in which the 
EEOC made a "reasonable cause" determination and cases in which the EEOC issued a "no 
reasonable cause" determination, which together appear to include all of the cases that 
resulted in a final administrative decision by the EEOC. In other words, these numbers do 
not include cases that were settled or withdrawn, or cases in which the complainant requested 
a "right-to-sue" letter after 180 days and thus never received an  actual finding from the EEOC 
(labeled "administrative closures" on the website). See id. 
132. Professors Clermont & Schwab reported these data. See Clermont & Schwab, supra 
note 17, a t  429-31,457. "Employment" cases included actions filed under Title VII, the ADA, 
the ADEA, the FMLA, and employment-related claims filed under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 or 
1983. See id. a t  431. Plaintawin rates for "torts and contracts" cases were compiled from "13 
sizable torts and contracts categories." Id. a t  458. The "nonjobs" cases are all federal cases 
other than the "employment" cases. See id. 
133. See Table 2 supra. 
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chance of winning.134 Despite these provisions, however, the Act fails 
to produce corresponding employee victories. 
It  should be noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates set forth in 
Table 1 do not include all of the possible outcomes of a Sarbanes- 
Oxley complaint filed with OSHA; Table 1 addresses only cases in 
which an  administrative decision was made. Sarbanes-Oxley 
complaints also could settle, be withdrawn,135 or be sent to arbitra- 
tion. Table 3 sets forth the percentage of cases resolved with each of 
these possible outcomes a t  both the OSHA and the AU levels of 
review. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14; see also Philip M. Berkowitz, Whistleblower 
Regulations, 27 NAPL L.J., 1 (2004) (noting "the extraordinary risk [to business] that this 
statute imposes"); Flahardy, supra note 14, a t  24 (quoting management attorneys who 
recognize that the "burden of proof for an  employee to establish a violation is very low" 
(internal quotation omitted)); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Whistle-Blower Retaliation Liability 
Cascading, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug. 14, 2006, a t  23-24. 
135. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.114(a) (2006). Of all AU cases in which the employee withdrew 
(92 observations), almost half (45, or 48.9%) declared that they were filing in federal court, 
while another 5 (5.4%) stated that they intended to file a claim in state court. The data did 
not provide a rationale for the withdrawal for a fairly large number of these ALJ cases: 30, 
or 32.6%. At the OSHA Level, a large percentage of cases (72.2%) did not provide a reason for 
the employee's withdrawal. A complete table setting forth the rationales provided by 
employees who withdrew complaints can be found online. See Richard E. Moberly, Basic Data 
for Unfulfilled Expectations Article, tbl.J, http://www.wm.edullawlpublicationsflawreviewl 
documents/basic-data.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Basic Data]. 
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Table 3: Outcomes of OSHA and ALJ Review 
Outcome OSHA Level I ALJ Level 
1 vn nn/  37.8% Employer Win 
I Employee Win I 2.6% (13) 
Employee Withdrawal 
Settlement 
Arb i t r a t i~n '~~  
category. 
Total 
As Table 3 demonstrates, almost three-fourths of cases a t  the 
OSHA Level (73.5%) received a determination either for the 
employee or the employer. ALJs, however, resolved dramatically 
fewer of the cases filed (40.4%) because more employees settled or 
withdrew their claims. Although the study focused on the cases that 
fully completed each stage of the administrative process, the 
settlements and withdrawals certainly impacted the types of cases 
left to be resolved by administrative decision makers. 
The extent of this impact is difficult to determine. Settlement of 
a case may provide some indication that  the case had a t  least 
minimal merit and therefore arguably could be counted as  an  
employee success. Indeed, settlements may have removed the 
strongest employee cases from the pool of cases, causing the 
employee win rate in resolved cases to appear lower than the 
. , 
14.7% 
(72) 
11.6% 
(57) 
0.2% 
(1) 
136. Because of arbitration agreements in employment contracts, these cases either were 
ordered to arbitration or the parties agreed that arbitration was the more appropriate forum. 
. , 
40.0% 
(92) 
18.3% 
(42) 
1.3% 
(3) 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
. , 
100.0% 
(491) 
As demonstrated by Table 3, arbitration issues had little impact because cases were seldom 
sent to arbitration--only once a t  the OSHA Level of review and three times by an ALJ. This 
seemingly low number could be the result of an  early federal court decision that required a 
Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff to arbitrate a Sarbanes-Oxley claim, which could have influenced 
employees with arbitration agreements to not attempt to file their claims administratively. 
See Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
. ,
100.0% 
(230) 
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number of "meritorious" claims actually filed.13' On the other hand, 
given the higher settlement rate a t  the ALJ Level than a t  the OSHA 
Level, a settlement may simply reflect a n  employer's increased 
willingness to enter "nuisance-value" settlements rather than pay 
the high litigation costs of an  ALJ hearing.13' Or employers may 
have settled a case involving allegations of corporate fraud to avoid 
bad publicity, even if the allegations were without merit.13' 
The settlement rate for Sarbanes-Oxley cases appears similar to 
the settlement rate for claims before the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the other primary administrative 
forum for employment claims. EEOC claims settled a t  approxi- 
mately the same rate-14.7% from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005-as 
Sarbanes-Oxley OSHA cases.l4' Both of these settlement rates pale 
in comparison to the settlement rate for cases once they reach the 
court system. For example, scholars estimate that  more than 60% 
of cases filed in federal court settle each year.141 As indicated by 
Table 3, Sarbanes-Oxley cases settled a t  a much lower rate: 11.6% 
137. In fact, OSHAcomputes its percentage of "merit"reso1utions by combiningsettlements 
with employee wins. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative 
Assistance, to author (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author). 
138. The study's results support this inference because 16.9% of employer wins a t  the 
OSHA Level settle after the win, which is higher than the settlement rate before the OSHA 
decision in the employer's favor. Another explanation for this settlement rate, however, is that 
employees may be more willing to settle after losing a t  the OSHA Level. See Moberly, Basic 
Data, supra note 135, a t  tb1.B. 
139. Some anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon exists in the Sarbanes-Oxley context. 
See Judy Greenwald, Whistleblower Retaliation Claims Challenging Employers, 39 Bus. INS. 
4 (2005) ("Some observers say fear of being associated with a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
suit is leading some employers to settle even when they feel the claim has no merit. 'They fear 
the potential bad publicity,' said James S. Urban, an  attorney with Jones Day in Pittsburgh."); 
see also Michael R. Triplett, Uncertainty About Parameters of SOX Claims Creates Challenges 
for Lawyers on Both Sides, 4 WORKPLACE L. REP. 482, 482 (2006), available a t  http://pubs. 
bna.com/ip/bna/whl.nsffeh/aOb2q6pOv8 (reporting that a management attorney claims 
employers have a clear incentive to settle Sarbanes-Oxley cases before entering the 
administrative review process because of the types of complaints Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblowers lodge and the high-level positions often held by whistleblowers). 
140. I calculated this settlement rate from statistics published on the EEOC website by 
dividing the number of settlements and withdrawals with benefits (36,781 observations) by 
the total number of resolutions during Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005 (250,366 observations). See 
EEOC, All Statutes, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). 
141. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100, a t  136 (noting that 66.7% of all federal 
civil cases terminated during fiscal year 2000 settled); Parker, supra note 15, a t  904, 912 
(finding a settlement rate of 67% in study of race and national origin discrimination cases in 
two federal district courts in 2002). 
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at the OSHA Level and 18.3% a t  the ALJ Leve1.1d2 This lower rate 
may indicate that  parties were less willing to settle in the early 
years of Sarbanes-Oxley, perhaps because the parties lacked 
certainty regarding the possible breadth of OSHA's and the ALJs' 
interpretations of the scope of the Act. On the other hand, given the 
similar settlement rate for EEOC claims, Sarbanes-Oxley's settle- 
ment rate may reflect a more general reluctance of parties to settle 
in an  administrative forum rather than in a court case. 
The ambiguity of the settlement data in the study conceals the 
full meaning of a Sarbanes-Oxley settlement as  it relates to the 
employee win rate.ld3 Do settlements provide employees relief com- 
parable to wins? I t  is M i c u l t  to say whether a settlement should be 
counted as  a n  employee "win," given that both sides inevitably 
compromise their claims when they settle.ld4 Unfortunately, OSHA 
and the OALJ refuse to release data that  could provide insight into 
this issue: the amount paid in settlement costs.ld5 
Similarly, employee withdrawals have uncertain meaning in this 
context. One assumption may be that  employees with strong cases 
withdrew from the administrative process to file in federal court, 
with the hope of obtaining a large damage award from a jury. Yet, 
the study's results demonstrate that  41% of the cases that employ- 
ers won at the OSHA Level were withdrawn by employees before a n  
AU decision could be reached.ld6 Moreover, a substantial number 
of cases that withdrew likely had little or no merit; either employees 
withdrew without asserting any reason for their withdrawal (72.2% 
at the OSHA Level and 32.6% a t  the ALJ Level), or they withdrew 
after admitting that a prima facie case of retaliation could not be 
proven (2.8% and 6.5%), or for some other reason, such as  admitting 
- -  - -- - - -- 
142. See Table 3 supra. 
143. Cf. Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t  256 ('It is hard to categorize settlements as pro- 
plaintiff or pro-defendant since plaintiffs typically settle for less than they seek in litigation."); 
Parker, supra note 15, a t  910 (''[A] settlement can't be defined as either a win or a loss."). 
144. See Parker, supra note 15, a t  909. 
145. The Department of Labor regulations require that OSHA or the OALJ approve 
Sarbanes-Oxley settlement agreements. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.11 l(d)(l)-(d)(2) (2006). Through 
the Freedom of Information Act, I requested information from OSHA and the OALJ related 
to these settlements, but this request had not been fully resolved by the time of this Article's 
publication. 
146. A complete table setting forth the outcome a t  the ALJ Level of cases in which the 
employer won a t  the OSHA Level can be found in Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t  
tb1.B. 
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that  they misunderstood the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or 
determined that  further litigation expenses were not warranted 
(5.6% and 6.5%).14' Thus, a reasonable conclusion may be that  
employees with weaker cases withdrew. These withdrawals could 
have depleted the pool of strong employer cases, meaning that  the 
employee win rate might have been even lower had these cases not 
been withdrawn. 
Ultimately, the data presently available regarding Sarbanes- 
Oxley settlements and withdrawals do not provide definitive 
answers regarding the objective merit of either the overall pool of 
cases or the cases that receive administrative  decision^.'^^ Thus, we 
do not know, and cannot determine, whether employees filed "good" 
or "%ad" Sarbanes-Oxley cases.14' 
However, the employee win rate presented in Table 1 is meaning- 
ful if combined with a n  analysis of the types of decisions made by 
OSHA and the ALJs when resolving Sarbanes-Oxley claims. The 
manner in which OSHA and the ALJs reached their decisions 
provides some explanation for this unexpectedly low employee win 
rate. Thus, the balance of this Part empirically examines how OSHA 
and the AUs resolved so many cases in favor of employers and 
against employees. 
147. See id. a t  tb1.J. 
148. If settlements and withdrawals are included in calculations regarding employee 
success rate, then the numbers change dramatically. Employee wins and settlements 
combined are 14.2% of all OSHA cases filed, and 20.9% of all ALJ filings. See Table 3 supra. 
If withdrawals and arbitrations are excluded because they did not complete the process, then 
the employee wins and settlements combined are 16.7% of the remaining OSHA cases filed, 
and 35.6% of the remaining ALJ cases. See id. 
149. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL . REV. 
581, 588-89 (1998) (explaining that inferences from win rates to generalizations about the 
types of cases being filed can be dangerous). Similarly, little can be inferred from the results 
of this study regarding the overall effect of Sarbanea-Oxley in the workplace, such a s  whether 
more or less whistleblowing or more or less retaliation occurs, a s  these concerns lie beyond 
the scope of the present study. This study does not examine the overall pool of potential 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases, only the actual pool of such cases filed with OSHA. See id. a t  589 
('[Tlhe case-selection effect theory holds that win rates reveal something about the set of 
adjudged cases, and not much about the underlying mass of disputes and cases."). 
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B. Explaining the Low Win Rate: The Importance of Procedural, 
Boundary, and Causation Hurdles 
A Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower must overcome a series of 
hurdles in order to prevail in either a n  OSHA investigation or an  
ALJ hearing. Failure to surmount any of these hurdles will result 
in an  employer victory. 
First, procedural hurdles require that the employee take action 
in a timely manner. The retaliation must have occurred after the 
effective date of the Act,150 the complaint must be filed within 90 
days of the retaliation,151 and any appeal must be filed within 30 
days of a n  OSHA decision.15' When OSHA or an  ALJ makes a 
decision in favor of a n  employer because the employee failed to 
overcome one of these hurdles, the study identified that decision as 
using a "procedural rationale." 
Second, an  employee must demonstrate that the claim is within 
the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley. The whistleblower must be a 
covered employee,153 work for a covered employer,154 engage in a 
covered ("protected") activity,155 and suffer a covered adverse 
150. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2003-SOX-23 ( A U  
Jan. 16, 2004); Kunkler v. Global Futures & Forex, Ltd., 2003-SOX-6 (ALJ Apr. 24, 2003); 
Gilmore v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 2003-SOX-1 ( A U  Feb. 6, 2003). Even if the protected 
activity occurred before the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley, a whistleblower claim could be 
based on retaliation that occurred after the effective date. See, e.g., Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 
2003-SOX-8, a t  15 (AkJ Feb. 2, 2004). 
151. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(b)(2)@) (Supp. IV 2004). 
152. See 29 C.F.R. $ 1980.105(c) (2006). 
153. A U s  consistently have not permitted workers in a foreign country to assert claims 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., Ede v. Swatch Group, 2004-SOX-68, a t  2 ( A U  Jan. 14,2005); 
Concone v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 2005-SOX-6, a t  2 (AkJ Dec. 3,2004). 
154. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004) (prohibiting retaliation by any "company 
with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. $ 78L), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. $ 780(d))"). 
155. Not only must the employee complain about an  illegal activity covered by Sarbanes- 
Oxley, but the employee also must reasonably believe that the activity is covered by Sarbanes- 
Oxley. See id. 5 1514A(a)(l). Although there is some dispute, the ARB recently determined 
that the "reasonable belief' issue presents a legal question to be resolved by a judge. See 
Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 05-064, a t  10 (ARB May 31, 2007); see also Jarod 
S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & E m .  L. 25, 76 (2006) (arguing for 
this result). 
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employment a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  If a n  employer won because a n  employee's 
claim fell outside of these boundaries, then OSHA or the ALJ used 
a "boundary rationale." 
Third, a decision maker will evaluate the factual merits of the 
case only after the employee has satisfied all the procedural rules 
and has demonstrated that the complaint is within the boundaries 
of Sarbanes-Oxley. At that point, an employee must overcome 
causation hurdles by convincing the decision maker that  the 
employer knew about the whistleblower's protected activity, and 
that  this activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employ- 
ment action.15' If the employee proves causation, the employer may 
still attempt to demonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that  
it would have made the same employment decision absent any 
protected activity.15' AS with the other two hurdles, if a n  employer 
won because a n  employee failed to show causation or because the 
employer satisfied its clear and convincing burden of proof, then the 
case can be thought of as  being decided by a "causation rationale." 
The procedural and boundary rationales often involved decisions 
made as a matter of law-that is, with few or no factual disputes. By 
contrast, the causation rationale more frequently involved disputed 
factual issues that  a decision maker must resolve. 
The low win rate for employees (and corresponding high win rate 
for employers) can be explained, a t  least in part, by examining the 
effect of these hurdles on an  employee's case. 
1. The Size of the Hurdle Depended on the Level of Review 
The three categories of rationales set forth above contain 11 
different grounds on which a decision against a n  employee may rest; 
one or more was cited in almost every case an  employer won.15' 
156. Sarbanes-Oxley states it is unlawful for a covered employer to "discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an  employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment" because the employee engaged in protected activity. 18 
U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
157. See discussion supra Part 1.B (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley's burdens of proof). 
158. See id.; cf. Gonzalez, supra note 155, a t  81 (arguing that, in cases removed to federal 
court, a "SOX jury's main role as the fact finder is to resolve the issue of causation"). 
159. A twelfth, "othe? category can also be found in the cases. Of the 337 employer-win 
OSHA cases in which a rationale was discernable, 15 included a rationale other than one of 
the 11 set out in Table 4. Nine of these 15 simply stated that an employee's prima facie case 
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Table 4 presents the percentage of employer wins in which OSHA 
or an ALJ utilized each of these rationales. 
Table 4: Rationales Used When an Employer Wins 
NOTE: The percentages do not total 100% because OSHA and the 
U s  often provided more than one rationale when deciding a case. 
The percentages used in Table 4 are based on the number of cases in 
which coders could identify a specific rationale divided by the number 
Causation 
~~~ 
was not satisfied, but did not specify which elements were not met. Of the 87 such cases at 
the ALJ Level, five included this "other" rationale. 
Employment Action Not "Ad- 
verse" 
No Reasonable Belief 
No Employer Knowledge of 
Protected Activity 
Protected Activity Not a 
"Contributing Factor" in Ad- 
verse Employment Action 
Employer Satisfied "Clear 
and Convincing" Standard on 
Rebuttal 
11.1% 
(36) 
5.6% 
(18) 
5.9% 
(19) 
35.5% 
(115) 
11.7% 
(38) 
9.6% 
(8) 
14.5% 
(12) 
2.4% 
(2) 
21.7% 
(18) 
14.5% 
(12) 
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of cases in which coders could identify any rationale. Of the 348 cases 
in favor of the employer at  the OSHA Level, a rationale (other than 
the "other" category) was discernable in 324. Accordingly, 324 is used 
as  the denominator for Table 4's percentages. Of the 87 employer-win 
cases a t  the ALJ Level, 83 had discernable rationales (other than the 
"other" category) and therefore that number is used as the denomina- 
tor. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
A pattern develops when these rationales are ordered by catego- 
ries. The data displayed in Table 5 demonstrate that OSHA and the 
ALJs decided cases in favor of employers by utilizing somewhat 
different rationales. 
Table 5: Rationale Used in Cases Decided in Favor of Employer 
NOTE: In Table 5, the percentages do not total 100% because OSHA 
and the ALJs often provided more than one type of rationale when 
deciding a case. As with Table 4, the percentages used in Table 5 are 
based on the number of cases in which coders identified a specific 
rationale divided by the number of cases in which coders identified 
any rationale: 324 OSHA cases and 83 ALJ cases. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
Procedural 
Rationale 
Boundary 
Rationale 
Causation 
Rationale 
Difference 
1.89 times 
more likely 
a t  ALJ Level 
1.36 times 
more likely 
at  ALJ Level 
1.88 times 
more likely 
a t  OSHA 
Level 
OSHA Level 
21.0% of cases 
(68)" 
49.7% 
(161) 
45.4% 
(147) 
ALJ Level 
39.8% 
(33) 
67.5% 
(56) 
24.1% 
(20) 
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At both levels of review, OSHA and the ALJs resolved a substan- 
tial number of cases in favor of the employer as  a matter of law, by 
using either a procedural or a boundary rationale. Although ALJs 
used both rationales more frequently than OSHA, decision makers 
a t  both levels of review relied heavily on a legal analysis of a 
Sarbanes-Oxley claim prior to, or instead of, resolving any causation 
disputes. 
At the  OSHA Level, however, causation rationales played a n  
important role as  well. OSHA used one of the three causation 
rationales as  part of the case's determination in almost half of the 
cases (45.4%). Indeed, OSHA used a specific causation rationale 
-finding that  the employee failed to demonstrate that the protected 
activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employment 
action-more frequently than any other single rationale. Over 35% 
of the cases decided in favor of the employer utilized this specific 
rationale, either alone or in combination with other rati0na1es.l~~ 
By contrast, ALJs tended to resolve cases with one of the 
procedural or boundary rationales by determining that  Sarbanes- 
Oxley did not cover the employee's allegations. In  all cases decided 
in favor of the employer, ALJs provided a causation rationale 24.1% 
of the time.l6' Interestingly, in these cases, ALJs most often utilized 
a causation rationale in conjunction with one of the other two 
types of rationales. Of the 20 cases in which ALJs used a causation 
rationale, only 4 (20%) were decided solely based on that  type of 
rati0na1e.l~~ In  the other 16 cases, a causation rationale was used in  
conjunction with one or both of the other two types of rati0na1es.l~~ 
Thus, even when ALJs addressed the causal elements of a case, they 
typically did so only when also deciding the case as a matter of law 
with a procedural or boundary rationale. U s ,  explicitly or 
implicitly, utilized the lawyerly "even if ..." argument to address 
causation issues only as  a backstop to other arguments.la ALJs 
relied solely on a causation rationale in only 4 of the 83 cases they 
160. See Table 4 supra. 
161. See Table 5 supra. 
162. See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C. By contrast, of the 147 cases decided 
by OSHA using a causation rationale, OSHA cited only the causation rationale in 108 (73.5%) 
of these decisions. Id. OSHA utilized the causation rationale in conjunction with one or both 
of the other rationales in 39 cases (26.5%). Id. 
163. Id. 
164. See Table 4 supra. 
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decided in favor of the employer (4.8%), meaning that ALJs decided 
cases as  a matter of law over 95% of the time.165 By comparison, 
OSHA relied solely on causation issues 33.3% of the time.166 In 
short, OSHA was almost seven times more likely than a n  ALJ to 
cite causation issues as  determinative. 
This difference in emphasis impacted the outcomes of cases as  
they progressed through the administrative process. The data in 
Table 6 reveal that  A U s  typically upheld OSHA decisions when 
those decisions were based upon procedural or boundary grounds. 
However, when a causation rationale formed the basis of OSHA's 
decision, ALJs scrutinized those cases again for legal deficiencies, 
particularly boundary issues. Given that  the ALJ review is de novo, 
one expects a review of the same issues examined a t  the OSHA 
Level. Nonetheless, ALJs appear more likely to decide cases on 
procedural or boundary grounds, even if OSHA already utilized a 
causation rationale. 
Table 6: Rationales Used for Employer Wins at Each Level 
NOTE: The numbers in Table 6 do not equal the total number of 
employer-win cases at the ALJ Level because more than one rationale 
could be coded for each case. The numbers in bold represent consis- 
tent decision making across both levels. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
OSHA 
Procedural 
OSHA 
Boundary 
OSHA 
Causation 
165. See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C. Again, note that 4 of the 87 
employer-win cases did not have a discernable rationale (other than the "other" category) and 
therefore were not included in this calculation. See note accompanying Table 4 supra. 
166. Of the 324 cases that were decided for the employer at the OSHA Level and from 
which a rationale could be discerned (other than the "other" category), OSHA utilized only a 
causation rationale in 108 cases. See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C. 
ALJ 
Procedural 
64.0% 
(16)" 
19.0% 
(8) 
10.0% 
(3) 
ALJ 
Boundary 
28.0% 
(7) 
64.3% 
(27) 
46.7% 
(14) 
ALJ 
Causation 
8.0% 
(2) 
16.7.% 
(7) 
43.3% 
(13) 
Total 
100.0% 
(25) 
100.0% 
(42) 
100.0% 
(30) 
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This pattern of decision making effectively prevented employees 
from obtaining a n  ALJ hearing on the merits of whether their 
whistleblowing caused their adverse employment action. ALJs held 
factual hearings in only 28% of the cases in which a n  ALJ rendered 
a d e ~ i s i 0 n . l ~ ~  Moreover, having a hearing before a n  ALJ did not 
guarantee that the ALJ evaluated the causation elements of a case. 
In over half (58.6%) of the 29 cases in which a n  ALJ held a factual 
hearing, the ALJ decided the case on boundary g r 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~  
In  sum, Sarbanes-Oxley cases endured two rigorous filtering 
systems as  they advanced through the administrative process. 
First, both OSHA and the ALJs rejected cases based on procedural 
and boundary rationales. Second, even if a case survived OSHA's 
stringent legal evaluation, OSHA also rejected a large percentage 
of cases because the employee failed to prove causation (that is, 
that  the employer knew about the employee's protected activity and 
that  the employee's whistleblowing was a contributing factor in an  
employer's adverse employment action) or because the employer 
satisfied its "clear and convincing" burden. Interestingly, ALJs 
typically upheld OSHA determinations for the employer, but in so 
doing, ALJs utilized legal rather than causation rationales. ALJs 
rarely relied on a causation determination alone to resolve 
Sarbanes-Oxley claims. 
2. Specific Legal Hurdles Loomed Large 
OSHA and the ALJs focused on three legal rationales when 
deciding in favor of the employer: one procedural, and two related 
to Sarbanes-Oxley's boundaries. As detailed below, the administra- 
tive focus on these three issues often led to narrow interpretations 
of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal parameters that  negatively impacted 
employees' claims. 
167. ALJs held hearings in 26 out of the 93 cases in which ALJs rendered a decision. See 
id. at tb1.D. 
168. When ALJs held a hearing, they resolved the case using a procedural rationale 6.9% 
of the time (2 observations); a boundary rationale 58.6% of the time (17 observations); and a 
causation rationale 58.6% of the time (17 observations). See id. at tb1.E. These percentages 
total more than 100% because ALJs often used more than one rationale. 
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a. Statute of Limitations 
Both OSHA and the ALJs focused intently on whether the 
employee filed a Sarbanes-Oxley claim within the Act's 90-day 
statute of limitations. In approximately one-third (33.8%) of the ALJ 
cases decided in favor of the employer, ALJs found that the 
employee failed to file a claim within 90 days.16' OSHA utilized this 
rationale in 18.8% of cases it decided in favor of the e m p 1 0 ~ e r . l ~ ~  
Despite this seeming difference between OSHA and the U s ,  both 
levels of review often found violations of the statute of limitations 
in the same cases, indicating a similar focus by both sets of decision 
makers. OSHA used this rationale in  72.2% of the ALJ cases that  
also found a statute of limitations violation.171 
In  many cases, administrative decision makers have little or no 
discretion regarding enforcement of the statute of limitations; the 
Act is clear regarding the 90-day limitations period. Moreover, the 
Department of Labor's regulations clarify that the 90-day filing 
window begins when an  employee has  knowledge of an adverse 
employment action, not when the action actually occurred.172 
Accordingly, these clear rules require that  OSHA and ALJs reject 
complaints when employees fail to file within 90 days of the notice 
of a n  adverse action, even if the adverse action actually occurred 
within 90 days of the filing of the c0mp1aint.l~~ 
However, OSHA and the ALJs also strictly enforced the statute 
of limitations in cases in which discretion could be utilized to excuse 
a n  employee's late filing. For example, OSHA and ALJs consistently 
rebuffed employees' claims that  the statute of limitations should 
169. See Table 4 supra. 
170. See id. 
171. The study obtained data on the OSHA result in 18 of the 28 ALJ statute of limitations 
cases, and OSHA also concluded that the statute of limitations was not met in 13 of those 18 
cases (72.2%), indicating that OSHA also seems to focus on the statute of limitations issue. 
The other 10 cases were cases in which an  ALJ opinion was available, but no OSHA opinion 
was included in the production of cases in response to my FOIA request. Thus, it may be that 
statute of limitations cases are appealed to U s  a t  a higher rate, which would account for 
the more frequent use of the statute of limitations rationale a t  the ALJ Level. 
172. See Procedures, supra note 59, a t  52,106. 
173. See, e.g., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, 2004-SOX-65, a t  5 (ALJ Sept. 9, 2004); Halpern v. 
XL Capital, Ltd., 2004-SOX-54, a t  3 (AW June 7, 2004); Letter from Marthe B. Kent, Reg'l 
Adm'r, OSHA (Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from Adam M. Finkel, Reg'l Adm'r, 
OSHA, to Michelle R. Kestler (Feb. 3,2003) (on file with author). 
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be tolled or not enforced for equitable reasons. Equitable tolling of 
the statute of limitations typically is permitted when a n  employee 
is unable, despite due diligence, to gain information necessary to 
file a timely c0mp1aint.l~~ Similarly, equitable estoppel prevents 
enforcement of the statute of limitations because the employer 
stopped the employee from filing a timely c0mp1aint.l~~ Neither 
equitable argument has had much success in Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases.176 For example, in one ALJ case the parties agreed that while 
they explored settlement options, the employee would not file a 
Sarbanes-Oxley claim and the employer would not assert a statute 
of limitations defense.177 As a result, the employee ultimately filed 
a complaint outside of the limitations ~ e r i 0 d . l ~ ~  The ALJ rejected the 
application of equitable tolling or estoppel principles and dismissed 
the case for failure to file within the limitations period, despite the 
parties' agreement to the contrary.17' 
Administrative decision makers equitably tolled the statute of 
limitations in only one case. In a case brought against Southwest 
Securities very early in the life of the Act, both OSHA and an  ALJ 
permitted a pro se employee to pursue a claim even though she 
missed the deadline by two days.lS0 The employee had attempted 
to file her complaint with various governmental agencies other 
174. See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). 
175. See id. a t  1176. 
176. See, e.g., Levi v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 2006-SOX-37, a t  22-23 (ALJ May 3,2006); 
Guy v. SBC Global Servs., 2005-SOX-113, a t  3-4 (AW Dec. 14,2005); Letter from Marthe B. 
Kent, Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with author); Letter from Marthe B. Kent, 
Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA @ec. 7,2004) (on fde with author). 
177. See Szymonik v. TyMetrix, Inc., 2006-SOX-50, a t  2 (AW Mar. 8, 2006). 
178. See id. a t  1-2. 
179. See id. a t  5. Although ARB decisions are not included in this study, it should be noted 
that the ARB follows a similarly rigid line. Prior to October 1, 2006, employees requested 
equitable tolling either of the statute of limitations or of a n  appeal's filing deadline in six 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases before the ARB. The Board refused such requests in every case. Carter 
v. Champion Bus, Inc., No. 05-076, a t  1-2 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006); Lotspeich v. Starke Meml 
Hosp., No. 05-072, a t  4 (ARB July 31,2006); Harvey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 04-114, 
a t  17 (ARB June 2,2006); Moldauer v. Canandaigua Wine Co., No. 04-022, a t  1 (ARB Dec. 30, 
2005); Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., No. 04-120, a t  5 (ARB Aug. 31,2005); Minkina v. Affiliated 
Physicians Group, No. 05-074, a t  2 (ARB July 29,2005). The Board also denied an employer's 
request for equitable tolling of the deadline for f h g  a cross-appeal in the one case involving 
such a request from the employer. See Henrich v. EcoLab, Inc., No. 05-036, a t  1 , 6  (ARB Mar. 
31,2005). 
180. See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2003-SOX-8, a t  29 n.2 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004); Letter from 
Patricia K. Clark, Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA, a t  2 (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
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than OSHA prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but 
did not file with OSHA until after the limitations period had 
run.18' Under these unique circumstances, both OSHA and the ALJ 
determined that  her efforts to file her claim in the wrong forum 
equitably tolled the limitations period.182 This case stands out for 
another reason besides the application of the equitable tolling 
doctrine: the employee ultimately won her claim,'83 making her one 
of only thirteen employees at the OSHA Level and one of only six 
employees a t  the AW Level to emerge v i c to r i~us . ' ~~  I t  is intriguing 
to consider how many other claims might have been valid but for the 
mistake of filing after the limitations deadline. 
b. Covered Employers 
ALJs, and to a lesser extent OSHA, also focused on whether the 
respondent was a "covered employer'' under Sarbanes-Oxley. ALJs 
decided 28.9% of their cases in favor of respondents because the Act 
failed to cover the employer.185 By comparison, OSHA decided 15.4% 
of its cases with this rationale.lE6 When a n  ALJ found that  the 
respondent was not a "covered employer," the corresponding opinion 
from OSHA used this rationale less than half of the time (42.1%).ls7 
ALJs found that  the employer was not the type of company covered 
by Sarbanes-Oxley a t  a much higher rate than OSHA and often in 
cases in which OSHA did not focus on that  issue. 
The difference between OSHA and the ALJs when evaluating the 
"covered employer'' issue seems to result from ambiguity in the Act's 
statutory language. The Act provides that: 
No company with a class of securities registered under section 
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 4 781), or 
181. See Getman, 2003-SOX-8,29 at n.2. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. at 19. The ARB later overturned her victory for an unrelated reason. See .' 
Getman v. Sw. Sec., No. 04-059 (ARB July 29,2005). 
184. See Table 1 supra. 
185. See Table 4 supra. 
186. See id. 
187. Twenty-four ALJ cases used this rationale. See Table 4 supra. The study included 
OSHA data for 19 of those 24 cases. In those 19 cases, OSHA also utilized the "not a covered 
employer" rationale in 8 cases (42.1%). 
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that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securi- 
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 5 780(d)), or any officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, 
may [retaliate] against an employee in the terms and conditions 
of employment because of any lawful act done by the 
employee.188 
The Act clearly covers employees of publicly traded companies, or in 
other words, companies that  have a class of securities registered 
under section 12 or that  are required to file reports under section 
15.lS9 Determining whether a company is publicly traded or 
privately held is relatively straightforward: either a respondent 
meets one of these two definitions or it does not.lgO Accordingly, it 
seems logical that  OSHA and the ALJs would make this finding a t  
relatively equivalent rates, which they did. OSHA found a company 
was "privately held" in 64% of the cases in which OSHA cited the 
"covered employer" rationale, while ALJs made this finding in 58.3% 
of the relevant cases.lgl 
However, the statutory language does not clearly set forth 
whether the Act applies to privately held subsidiaries of publicly 
traded companies. The ALJs focused on this ambiguity much more 
intensely than OSHA. In 41.7% of ALJ cases using the "not a 
covered employer" rationale, ALJs found that a n  employer was not 
covered by the Act because it was a subsidiary of either a publicly 
traded company or a foreign company.lg2 By contrast, OSHA made 
this same determination a t  about one-fourth the rate, 10%.lg3 Thus, 
the difference in usage of the "covered employer" rationale between 
188. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added). 
189. See id. 
190. See id. Perhaps not surprisingly, disputes on the borderline of this issue have arisen. 
See Flake v. New World Pasta Co., No. 03-126, a t  2 (ARB Feb. 25, 2004) (finding that 
respondent was not covered under the Act because its registration statement was 
automatically suspended when its shares were held by less than 300 people); Stalcup v. 
Sonoma Coll., 2005-SOX-114, a t  6 (ALJ Feb. 7, 2006) (finding that respondent which filed 
registration statement that had not yet become effective was not covered by the Act); Roulett 
v. Am. Capital Access, 2004-SOX-9, a t  7-8 (ALJ Dec. 22, 2004) (finding company that 
withdrew request for registration was not covered). 
191. A complete table setting forth the types of companies OSHA and the ALJs found were 
not "covered employers" can be found a t  Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t  tb1.G. 
192. See id. 
193. See id. 
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OSHA and the ALJs seems best explained by the difference in how 
these administrative decision makers evaluated private subsidiaries 
of public companies. 
The subsidiary issue arises in Sarbanes-Oxley cases because the 
Act prohibits discrimination by "any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent" of publicly traded companies.lg4 Early con- 
flicts in ALJ interpretations of this phrase as  it relates to whether 
Sarbanes-Oxley covers privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded 
corporations may have caused differing levels of enforcement by 
ALJs and OSHA. Soon after the Act's enactment, a n  ALJ inter- 
preted this phrase broadly to mean that employees of privately 
held subsidiaries were protected by the Act, particularly if the 
employee named the publicly traded parent as  a respondent.lg6 
Other ALJs permitted employees of privately held subsidiaries to 
bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims because the employee specifically 
alleged that  the publicly held parent company was involved in the 
retaliationlS6 or that the subsidiary was a "mere instrumentality" of 
the public corp~ration.'~' All of these findings occurred before 
September 2004.1g8 
These early and relatively broad interpretations of the Act's 
"covered employer" provision may have influenced OSHA's reluc- 
tance to rely on this rationale in finding for the employer. However, 
beginning in late 2004 and early 2005, ALJ opinions consistently 
demonstrated a stricter reading of this provision. Some U s  held 
that  employees of privately held subsidiaries could not bring a 
Sarbanes-Oxley claim at a11.1g9 Others rejected claims because the 
employee did not specifically name the publicly traded parent as  a 
respondent, and ALJs refused to allow the employee to amend the 
complaint.200 Many ALJs required that a n  employee either pierce 
194. 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
195. See Morefield v. Exelon Sews., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t  2-3 ( A U  Jan. 28, 2004). 
196. Gonzalez v. Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-39, a t  3 ( A U  Aug. 20, 2004). 
197. Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, a t  19 (ALJ Apr. 30, 2004). 
198. See supra notes 195-97. 
199. See Grant v. Dominion E. Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, a t  33 ( A U  Mar. 10, 2005). 
200. See Bothwell v. Am. Income Life, 2005-SOX-57, a t  7 ( A U  Sept. 19, 2005); see also 
Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2003-AIR-12, a t  4 (ALJ Mar. 5, 2003). Recently, the ARB 
found that publicly traded parent companies did not need to be named a s  a respondent in 
order for an employee of a privately held subsidiary to bring a Sarbanes-Oxley claim. See 
Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, a t  2, 15 (ARB May 31, 2006) 
(noting that subsidiary was agent of the parent). 
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the corporate veil between the subsidiary and the parent201 or 
demonstrate that  the publicly traded parent company participated 
in the adverse employment action.202 
The ALJs' focus on the "covered employer" issue, and the 
subsequent narrowing of the scope of this statutory provision, 
seem to have affected OSHA. Although the cumulative results 
from the study indicate a difference between OSHA and the ALJs in 
the use of the "not a covered employer" rationale compared to other 
rationales,203 any distinction between ALJs and OSHA regarding 
enforcement of this covered employer requirement occurred pri- 
marily in the first few years after the statute's enactment. 
Chart 1: OSHA Decisions Finding That Respondent Was Not a Covered 
Employer 
OSHA Found Respondent Was Not a Covered Employer 
Quarter and Year I 
201. See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57, a t  8-9; Dawkins v. Shell Chem., LP, 2005-SOX-41, a t  4 
(ALJ May 16,2005); Hughart v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 2004-SOX-9, a t  44 (AW Dec. 
17,2004); cf. Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2003-AIR-12, a t  4 (ALJ Mar. 5,2003) (earlier 
case). 
202. See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57, a t  9; see also Hughart, 2004-SOX-9, a t  44 (extending 
liability to parent only in area where "parent has exerted its influence or control"). In May 
2006, the ARB adopted similarly restrictive interpretations of the Act by permitting a claim 
against a privately held subsidiary, but only because the employee specifically demonstrated 
that the subsidiary acted as a n  agent of the publicly traded parent company when the 
subsidiary fired the employee. See Klopfenstein, No. 04-149, a t  15. The ARB found sigmficant 
the fact that the subsidiary and the parent had overlapping officers and that the person who 
made the decision to fire the whistleblower sewed as an  officer of both the subsidiary 
employer and the parent company. See id. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86; see also Table 4 supra. 
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OSHA may have responded to the more recent and numerous ALJ 
decisions narrowing the scope of this boundary issue. As indicated 
in Chart 1, in the first two years of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions, 
OSHA found that  the respondent was not a "covered employer" in 
a total of 23 cases.204 In the first three quarters of 2005 alone, 
however, OSHA made this finding 25 times.'05 This upward trend in 
OSHA's use of the "not a covered employer" rationale may reflect 
the attention OSHA pays to ALJ opinions regarding the definitional 
boundaries of the Act. As of the end of the time period covered by 
the study, it seems fair to conclude that both OSHA and the ALJs 
focused intensively on whether the named employer was "covered" 
by Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory definition. 
c. Protected Activity 
OSHA and the ALJs focused on a third legal question: whether 
the employee engaged in "protected activity" covered by Sarbanes- 
Oxley. The Act protects only whistleblowers who disclose violations 
of one or more of six specifh types of laws, rules, or regulations. 
Specifically, in order to be protected, a n  employee must disclose 
conduct that  the employee reasonably believes constitutes a 
violation of: 
1. 18 U.S.C. 5 1341 (mail fraud); 
2. 18 U.S.C. 5 1343 (wire fraud); 
3. 18 U.S.C. 5 1344 (banking fraud); 
4. 18 U.S.C. 5 1348 (securities fraud); 
5. Any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; or 
6. Any provision of federal law relating to fraud against 
 shareholder^.^'^ 
In  24.1% of the cases in which ALJs found in favor of the employer, 
ALJs determined that  the employee did not engage in protected 
activity because the whistleblower's disclosure did not relate to one 
204. See Chart 1 supra. A complete table setting forth the use of the "not a covered 
employer" rationale over time can be found at Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.F. 
205. See id. 
206. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004). 
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of these statutorily defined illegal activities.207 OSHA relied on this 
rationale in 18.2% of the cases in which the employer prevailed.208 
Employees alleged certain protected activities far more frequently 
than others. Table 7, infra, sets forth the types of protected conduct 
alleged by employees, including allegations that relate specifically 
to the protected conduct set forth in the statutes as well as other 
types of conduct. 
207. See Table 4 supra. 
208. See id. ' 
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Table 7: Type of Protected Activity Alleged When the "No Protected 
Activity" Rationale is Used Compared to the Overall Pool of Cases 
NOTE: The percentages in Table 7 reflect the percentage of cases in 
which coders could identify the type of illegal activity allegedly 
disclosed. At the OSHA Level, the type of disclosure made could be 
discerned in 418 cases. At the ALJ Level, it could be ascertained in 
Protected Activ- 
ity 
(Type of Illegal 
Activity Dis- 
closed by 
Whistleblower) 
Banking Fraud 
(§ 1344) 
Securities 
Fraud 
(9 1348) 
Mail / Wire 
Fraud 
($5 1341 1 1343) 
Violation of 
SEC Rules and 
Regs 
Federal Law 
Relating to 
Shareholder 
Fraud 
All 
OSHA 
Cases 
1.4% 
(6)" 
3.6% 
(15) 
4.8% 
(20) 
8.6% 
(36) 
15.3% 
(64) 
"NPA" 
Rationale 
Used - 
OSHA 
3.5% 
(2) 
1.8% 
(1) 
3.5% 
(2) 
3.5% 
(2) 
8.8% 
(5) 
I 24.2% Fraud (101) 31.6% (18) 
14.0% 
(8) 
78.9% 
(45) 
Accounting 
Fraud 
All ALJ 
Cases 
2.7% 
(5) 
4.8% 
(9) 
7% 
(13) 
11.3% 
(21) 
19.9% 
(37) 
29.4% 
(123) 
"NPA" 
Rationale 
Used - 
ALJ 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
15% 
(3) 
15% 
(3) 
28.0% 
(52) 
31.7% 
(59) 
52.7% 
(98) Other I 48.1% (201) 
45% 
(9) 
L 
40.0% 
(8) 
75% 
(15) 
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186 cases. For the "no protected activity" columns, the percentages 
are from the 57 OSHA cases and the 20 AW cases in which "no 
protected activity" was the rationale used by OSHA and the AW, 
respectively, and the type of illegal activity allegedly disclosed could 
be discerned. The percentages do not equal 100% because more than 
one protected activity could be alleged. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
As Table 7 indicates, employees alleged that they blew the whistle 
on general "fraud" or fraud related generally to "accounting" a t  a 
much higher rate than the more specific types of fraud mentioned 
by the Act, including mail and wire fraud, banking fraud, and 
securities fraud.''' Moreover, a n  extremely high number of employ- 
ees did not assert that they disclosed illegal activity related to any 
of the categories set forth by Sarbanes-Oxley: 48% of OSHA 
complainants and 52.7% of ALJ complainants alleged protected 
activity in the "other" category, at least a s  these allegations were 
described by administrative decision makers in their written 
opinions.210 
These data are particularly relevant'when examined next to data 
of cases in which the decision maker found for the employer 
precisely because the employee did not engage in a protected 
activity. In these "no protected activity" cases, certain types of 
illegal activity were alleged more frequently than in the overall pool 
of cases. As indicated in Table 7, the employee alleged blowing the 
whistle on illegal activity falling within the "other" category and the 
"fraud" category more frequently in cases in which the decision 
maker utilized the "no protected activity" rationale than in the 
overall pool of cases. 
209. These more specific types of fraud were only coded in the study if the decision 
mentioned these very specific words or statutory provisions as part of the allegations. In 
contrast, coders employed general "fraud" a s  a catch-all category in which fraud was 
mentioned in the decision, but not related to a specific statutory provision. Similarly, 
"accounting fraud" was coded if an  allegation related to accounting, but not to a more specific 
category. 
210. See Table 7 supra. These decisions may not necessarily reflect the language used by 
an employee to describe the employee's protected activity. However, the results do reflect how 
OSHA and the AUs thought about the employee's allegations regarding protected activity. 
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Employees alleged protected activity in the "other" category in 
78.9% and 75% of the cases a t  the OSHA and A W  Levels, respec- 
tively, in which decision makers utilized the "no protected activity" 
rationale. In the overall pool of cases, 48.1% of the OSHA complain- 
ants and 52.7% of the ALJ complainants alleged the  "other" 
category. A similar, yet smaller, jump can be seen when comparing 
the general "fraud" category in the same way. A higher percentage 
of cases utilized this rationale among the "no protected activity" 
cases than among the overall population of cases: 31.6% versus 
24.2% a t  the OSHA Level, and 45% versus 28% a t  the ALJ Level. 
Thus, OSHA and ALJs often utilized the "no protected activity" 
rationale in cases in which the employee alleged generalized 
protected activity, such as  disclosing "fraud" or some "other" mis- 
conduct. Employees who alleged specific types of misconduct, such 
as  "mail fraud" or "federal law relating to shareholder fraud," rarely 
lost cases because the decision maker found "no protected activity." 
This outcome could reflect OSHA's and AWs' reluctance to define 
broadly the categories of whistleblower disclosures that  Sarbanes- 
Oxley will protect. These two categories of "fraud" and "other" 
misconduct could be characterized as  the most amorphous and least 
bound by the specific statutory language of the Act. In  other words, 
those employees who framed their whistleblower disclosures to fall 
neatly within the Act's specific statutory provisions, such as  mail or 
wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities fraud, fared better than 
employees who alleged protected activity less grounded in  statutory 
language. 
Examining specific ALJ cases qualitatively demonstrates that  
many ALJs interpreted the Act's "protected activity" requirement 
narrowly. U s  required that whistleblowing employees draw a 
direct line between their disclosures of misconduct and the miscon- 
duct's relationship to shareholder fraud."' For example, in Grant u. 
Dominion East Ohio Gas, an  ALJ found that  an  employee properly 
211. See, e.g., Grant v. Dominion E. Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, at 40 (AW Mar. 10, 2005); 
Harvey v. Safeway, Inc., 2004-SOX-21, at 32 (AW Feb. 11, 2005) (finding that disclosures 
about underpayment of wages "did not have [the] necessary magnitude to raise a concern 
about fraud against the shareholders"); Hopkins v. ATKTactical Sys., 2004-SOX-19, at 5 (ALJ 
May 27, 2004) (dismissing claim based on retaliation for disclosing an employer's "release of 
sludge water into the ground water system" because disclosure neither alleged fraud nor 
"involve[d] transactions relating to securities"). 
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reported accounting irregularities and errors, but found that the 
employee did not engage in "protected activity" because the em- 
ployee was unable to tie these irregularities directly to active fraud 
on the  shareholder^.^'^ Similarly, the employees in Allen v. Stewart 
Enterprises, Inc., reported to their supervisors several instances 
of faulty interest calculations, inconsistent and untimely refunds, 
and improper accounting involving cost recognition.213 The ALJ 
refused to find a "protected activity" because the employees could 
not demonstrate that  these errors and omissions in financial 
accounting and reporting were related to a broader scheme of 
intentional corporate 
ALJs also demanded that  employee whistleblowers specifically 
inform the recipient of a whistleblower disclosure that  the illegal 
activity being reported violates one of Sarbanes-Oxley's identified 
federal laws.215 Under this interpretation, rather than merely 
reporting activity that  a n  employee reasonably views a s  illegal, the 
employee must have enough legal knowledge to tie that  activity to 
a specific illegality identified by the 
Yet, despite this narrow interpretation by some U s ,  others took 
a relatively broad view of the Act's "protected activity" requirement 
in specific cases. One early AU decision held that whistleblower 
disclosures about fraud that  amounted to only .0001% of the parent 
company's revenues could be protected.217 As noted by the ALJ, 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
212. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t  40-44 (emphasizing that the 'limited scope and 
application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not cover the complaints and allegations lodged 
by Complainant"). 
213. See Allen v. Stewart Enters., 2004-SOX-60, a t  83-84 (ALJ Feb. 15,2005). 
214. See id. a t  85-90. 
215. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t  40 ("[Slimply raising questions and lodging complaints 
without any reference to or suspicion about fraud against shareholders is not protected 
activity."). This requirement seems to contradict other ALJ decisions which held that a 
whistleblower was not required to specifically identify a particular code section that had been 
violated. See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, a t  10 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004); Gonzalez v. 
Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-39, a t  5 (ALJ Aug. 20,2004) (finding "support [for the] finding" that 
whistleblower had a reasonable belief that the activity disclosed involved "misconduct, 
regardless of whether he could speclfy specific banking, securities, shareholder, or mail fraud 
violations." (footnote omitted)). 
216. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t  39; cf. Allen, 2004-SOX-60, a t  86 (denying protection for 
whistleblower who reported a potential violation of state law, because such an  illegality is not 
specifically listed by Sarbanes-Oxley). 
217. See Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t  4-5 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004). 
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places no minimum dollar value on the protected activity it 
covers. Whether or not "materiality" is a required element of a 
criminal fraud conviction as Respondents contend, we need [to] 
be mindful that Sarbanes-Oxley is largely a prophylactic, not a 
punitive measure. The mere existence of alleged manipulation, 
if contrary to a regulatory standard, might not be criminal in 
nature, but it very well might reveal flaws in the internal 
controls that could implicate whistleblower coverage for seem- 
ingly paltry sums.218 
Furthermore, an  ALJ held that  the Act protected disclosures 
related to improper reimbursements to company employees, with no 
discussion of whether these reimbursements were "material" and 
thus required disclosure under the securities laws.219 Another ALJ 
found that  "protected activity" included a whistleblower's report of 
a n  employee's improper use of company materials and time to create 
sculptures for retiring coworkers.220 The Act protected this report 
because the sculptor "undoubtedly used the mail or wires as part of 
his sculpture business," and such fraudulent use would violate the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.221 
Commentators point to these examples and counterexamples 
a s  indications that ALJs are working through the Act's ambigu- 
ities, with decisions in favor of both employees and employers.222 
However, the study's results indicate that  the various interpreta- 
tions of the "protected activity" requirement are not as  evenly 
balanced as  these examples and counterexamples might indicate. In 
fact, the study demonstrates that  OSHA and the U s  frequently 
denied whistleblower claims because the employee purportedly 
failed to engage in "protected Decision makers resolved 
fully 24.1% of ALJ cases and 18.2% of OSHA cases in which the 
employer won because the employee did not allege the correct 
218. Id. at 5. 
219. See Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, at 22 (ALJ Apr. 30,2004). 
220. See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, at 9-10 (AW Dec. 9,2004). 
221. See id. at 10. 
222. See, e.g., Eugene Scalia, The Developing Law under the Sarbanes-&ley 
"Whistleblower"Protection Provision, 735 PLULIT 291 (2006); Triplett, supra note 139, at 482. 
223. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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"protected The study also found that  in addition to these 
cases, the ALJ determined that  the employee could not reasonably 
believe that the activity disclosed violated a law set forth in 
Sarbanes-Oxley in 14.5% of the decisions in which employers 
3. A Surprisingly Unfavorable Burden of Proof 
As discussed above, ALJs relied exclusively or primarily on legal 
rationales in 95.2% of the cases won by employers, while U s  
resolved only 4.8% of the cases using solely a causation rationale.226 
By contrast, OSHA reached the causation issues in 33.3% of the 
cases decided for employers.227 The results of the study call into 
question whether OSHA appropriately applied Sarbanes-Oxley's 
employee-friendly burden of proof in these causation cases.228 
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's favorable burden of proof, employees a t  
the OSHA Level rarely won when causation issues were evaluated. 
At this level, 121 cases presented only the factual question of why 
the employee suffered a n  adverse action.229 In these cases, the 
employee engaged in protected activity and suffered a n  adverse 
employment action. According to OSHA, the employee overcame all 
the procedural and boundary The only question to be 
answered was whether the employer retaliated against the em- 
ployee for engaging in a protected activity. As shown in Table 8, 
employees prevailed in only 10.7% of these 121 OSHA cases. 
224. See Table 4 supra. 
225. See id. The "reasonable belief' rationale was used less frequently a t  the OSHA Level. 
OSHA used this rationale in 5.6% of the cases that employers won. See id. 
226. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
227. See Table 5 supra; see supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
228. Recall that in a Sarbanes-Oxley case, after an  employee presents a prima facie case 
using the forgiving "contributing factor" standard, the burden of proof shifts to the employer, 
which must then satisfy a sigdicantly higher burden than normal. See Klopfenstein v. PCC 
Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, a t  19-21 (ARB May 31,2006); see also discussion supra 
Part I.B. 
229. This number was derived by examining cases in which OSHA decided in favor of the 
employer based solely on a causation rationale (108 observations) and cases in which the 
employee prevailed (13 observations). The employee wins were included because these cases, 
by definition, reached the causation element of the complaint. See infra Table 8. 
230. In other words, OSHA did not utilize a procedural or boundary rationale in its 
determination. 
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Table 8: Win Rates for Cases with Only Causation Disputes 
NOTE: Employer wins were included when "no employer knowledge," 
"contributing factor," or the employer's "rebuttal" were the only 
rationales provided by the decision maker. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
By contrast, a t  the ALJ Level, only a small number of cases 
-10.2%, or 9 out of 88-presented a causation issue regarding the 
"contributing factor" test or the employer's rebuttal burden.231 As 
discussed above, procedural or boundary rationales resolved the 
remaining ALJ employer-win cases.232 Of these 9 cases involving 
only causation disputes, U s  decided over half (5, or 55.6%) in 
favor of the employee.233 
Comparing the 10.7% win rate a t  the OSHA Level for "causation" 
cases with other win rates emphasizes its aberrational nature.234 
ALJ ~ e v e l  
55.6% 
(5) 
44.4% 
(4) 
100.0% 
(9) - 
Outcome 
Employee win 
Employer win 
Total 
231. See Table 8 supra. The total of nine ALJ cases was calculated by combining five 
employee wins on the merits with four employer wins in which an  ALJ utilized a causation 
rationale. Although six employees won a t  the AW Level, one employee won by default because 
the employer did not appear a t  the hearing. Thus, the ALJ did not address the causation 
issues in the case. 
232. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text. 
233. See Table 8 supra. The ALJ results also confirm the impact U s '  focus on legal 
rationales has on an employee's chance of success. If employees survived ALJs' legal analysis 
of procedural and boundary issues, employees seemed to benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley's 
favorable burden of proof. 
234. Although the win rates in Table 8 seem to approach, and even surpass, the win rates 
under other statutes set forth in Table 2 supra, the employee win rates set forth in Table 8 
occur in cases with only factual disputes involving causation, that is, all of the legal hurdles 
have been overcome. The win rates in Table 2 are overall win rates for cases in which a 
decision was rendered a t  any stage in the administrative or judicial process. 
OSHA 
Level 
10.7% 
(13)" 
89.3% 
(108) 
100.0% 
(121) 
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The strongest comparison may be with similar cases a t  the ALJ 
Level, in which 55.6% of employees won when only causation issues 
were evaluated. However, given the small raw number of ALJ 
decisions, consider other comparisons. For example, under other 
employment statutes, win rates for cases that  survive summary 
judgment and have a trial are analogous to win rates for cases with 
only causation disputes set forth in Table 8. A study of whistleblow- 
er  wrongful discharge cases in California in 1998 and 1999 found 
that  employees won 63% of the time a t  tria1236-almost six times the 
rate of employee wins a t  the OSHA Level under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Another study found that, in 2001,39.5% of employment discrimina- 
tion plaintiffs won trials in federal When compared with 
these win rates, the 10.7% win rate for causation cases a t  the OSHA 
Level seems extraordinarily low. 
One explanation for this 10.7% win rate may be that OSHA 
inappropriately utilized Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burden 
of proof. For example, the employee's initial burden to prove that  
the protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the retaliation 
should be a relatively low burden to overcome. Yet, a s  shown in  
Table 9, in over two-thirds of the 121 "causation rationale" cases 
(69.4%), OSHA determined that the employee did not meet this 
relatively low burden. Thus, because OSHA determined that  the 
employee failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation in these 
cases, OSHA never shifted the burden from the employee to force 
"clear and convincing" proof from the employer.237 By contrast, at 
the ALJ Level, the opposite result occurred. ALJs found that  
employees satisfied the "contributing factor" test and shifted the 
burden to employers in 66.7% of the "causation rationale" cases a t  
the ALJ 
235. See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 538. 
236. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 441. 
237. Nine of these 84 cases won by the employer alternatively held that the employer 
satisfied its "clear and convincing" evidence burden, utilizing an "even if" argument. 
238. See Table 9 infra. 
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Table 9: Determination of Contributing Factor Issue 
NOTE: Table 9 shows the result when the employee's "causation" 
burden is examined. Cases resolved "for the employer" determined 
that the employee failed to demonstrate that the employer had 
knowledge about the protected activity, or that the employee failed to 
satisfy the "contributing factor" test. Cases resolved for the employee 
on this issue included cases in which the employee won and cases in 
which the employer won solely because the employer satisfied its 
rebuttal burden of proof. 
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
category. 
Outcome 
For Em~lovee - Employee 
demonstrated protected activ- 
ity was contributing factor in 
retaliation 
For Emplover - Employee 
failed to satisfy the contribut- 
ing factor test 
Total 
Furthermore, even when OSHA shifted the burden to the 
employer and the issue was whether the employer met the "clear 
and convincing" standard, OSHA found in favor of the employer in 
a surprising number of cases. As set forth in Table 10, employees 
won only 13 of the 37 cases (35.1%) in which the employer had a 
"clear and convincing" burden of proof.239 Importantly, these 
employee wins occurred in Sarbanes-Oxley cases in which all 
Sarbanes-Oxley's legal requirements were met and the employer 
-not the employee-had the burden of proof under a "clear and 
convincing" standard. This difference in burdens should and can 
matter; by comparison, when the dispositive issue a t  the ALJ Level 
239. See Table 10 infra. 
OSHA 
Level 
30.6% 
(37)" 
69.4% 
(84) 
100.0% 
(121) 
ALJ Level 
66.7% 
(6) 
33.3% 
(3) 
100.0% 
(9) 
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was whether the "clear and convincing" burden was met, employees 
won 83.3% of the time.240 
Table 10: Determination of Employer's Rebuttal Burden of Proof 
category. 
Outcome 
For Employee - Employer 
failed to satisfy burden of proof 
by clear and convincing 
evidence 
For Emplover - Employer sat- 
isfied burden of proof 
Total 
The results a t  the OSHA Level contradicted expectations, for 
these were cases in which the employee supposedly met all of the 
legal hurdles required by Sarbanes-Oxley. The employee engaged in 
protected activity and suffered an  adverse employment action. The 
only question was whether a causal link existed between these 
events. Given the low burden for a n  employee to prove this point 
and the high burden for a n  employer, in essence, to disprove a 
negative (that it would have made the same decision regardless of 
the protected activity) on rebuttal, it seems reasonable to expect 
that  more than 10.7% of employees would win these "causation" 
cases. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that  OSHA did not 
have the resources to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley cases within 
the time frame the Agency's regulations required for it to complete 
a n  i n~es t i ga t i on .~~ '  Although Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases 
240. See id. I t  should be noted that the number of cases is very small: only six cases reached 
this stage, five of which were won by employees. This disparity between OSHA and the ALJs 
seems to support the conclusion that OSHA may examine causation issues more readily than 
the ALJs, but when U s  do examine them, the results seem more favorable to employees 
than a t  the OSHA Level. 
241. As noted above, the average time between the filing of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint 
" AU numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each 
OSHA 
Level 
35.1% 
(13)" 
64.9% 
(24) 
100.0% 
(37) 
ALJ Level 
83.3% 
(5) 
16.7% 
(1) 
100.0% 
(6) 
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currently comprise 13.2% of the whistleblower cases administered 
by OSHA,242 OSHA did not receive any additional funding to 
increase its investigative staff by hiring investigators with experi- 
ence in securities laws as  opposed to worker health and safety.243 
This lack of resources may have caused investigators to take 
shortcuts, thereby limiting the depth and scope of inquiry into a n  
employee's claims. Indeed, some employees and their attorneys 
assert that OSHA investigators did not interview employee- 
complainants and failed to provide employees with a chance to 
argue their cases 
In addition to OSHA's lack of resources, OSHA's investigative 
manual does not adequately explain Sarbanes-Oxley's unique 
burden of proof structure. The sections of the manual that  explain 
general investigative procedures give examples from the less 
employee-friendly burden of proof found in the Occupational Safety 
and Health This general section explains that  a "nexus" must 
be found between a whistleblower's protected activity and the 
adverse employment action, and describes the employer's rebuttal 
a s  requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.246 Although 
the specific chapter on Sarbanes-Oxley uses the proper "contributing 
factor" and "clear and convincing" standards, OSHA's investigative 
procedures section does not elaborate on the differences between 
this language and the language of the Occupational Safety and 
Health OSHA's investigative manual could easily mislead 
with OSHA and the issuance of a report by the OSHA investigator was 127 days for Fiscal 
Year 2005. See supra text accompanying note 91; see also E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., 
OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author). 
OSHA's regulations require an  investigation to be completed within 60 days. See 29 C.F.R. 
3 1980.105 (2006). 
242. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Mar. 2, 2007) (on frle with author). 
243. See Telephone Discussion with Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative 
Assistance (Jan. 29, 2007); see also Deborah Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New 
Shield is a n  Imperfect One, W W  ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, a t  A1 (reporting that OSHA 
investigators acknowledged that OSHA was "struggling with the new mandate" from 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
244. See Solomon, supra note 243. 
245. See OSHA, WHISTLEBLOWER INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-2, 3-3 (Aug. 22, 2003), 
available a t  http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html. 
246. See id. 
247. See id. a t  14-2. 
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OSHA's investigators as  to the true nature of Sarbanes-Oxley's 
unique burden of proof structure. 
Moreover, employers have several procedural advantages that 
may explain OSHA's willingness to accept a n  employer's explana- 
tion for a n  adverse employment action. OSHA does not have 
subpoena power and therefore cannot force employers to provide 
documents or require witnesses to testify.248 OSHA regulations 
allow employers to meet with investigators and dispute OSHA's 
conclusions, but employees do not have these same rights.249 Prior 
to April 2006, employees did not necessarily receive the employer's 
response to the complaint, even though employers received a copy 
of the employee's complaint.250 Employers can also specifically 
request that  OSHA withhold confidential information from employ- 
ees during and after the inves t iga t i~n .~~ '  
The way in which OSHA resolves cases involving disputes about 
causation may reflect these investigative issues. When deciding 
against employees so frequently in these "causation rationale" cases, 
OSHA closely evaluated the employee's own behavior, which the 
employer likely emphasized during the investigation. Two eviden- 
tiary determinations seem to have particularly influenced OSHA 
investigators. First, in almost half of the cases citing a causation 
rationale in favor of the employer (48.1%), OSHA found that  the 
employee engaged in  improper behavior, such as  insubordination or 
illegal Second, in 43.5% of these "causation rationale" 
248. See Solomon, supra note 243. By contrast, Congress provided OSHA with subpoena 
power to f u l f i  OSHA's obligations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See 29 
U.S.C. 5 657(b) (2000). 
249. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(e) (2006); Solomon, supra note 243. 
250. On April 11,2006, OSHA revised its investigative procedures. OSHA now states that: 
During an investigation, disclosure must be made to the complainant of a t  least 
the substance of the respondent's response. Other evidence submitted by the 
respondent (or the substance of it) may also be disclosed, so that the 
complainant can fully respond to the respondent's position and the investigation 
can proceed to a final resolution. The form and timing of the disclosure are a t  
OSHA's discretion. 
OSHA, REVISED INTERIM GUIDELINES ON CHANGES IN PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRIVACY 
ACT FILES AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS 9 II.A.2 (Apr. 11, 2006), available 
at http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/Reviseddinterim_guidelines.html. 
251. See 29 C.F.R. 1 1980.104(d) (2006); Solomon, supra note 243. 
252. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to support 
a causation decision for an  employer can be found a t  Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t  
tb1.M. 
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cases, OSHA found that  the employee suffered an adverse employ- 
ment action because of poor performance rather than as  a result of 
retaliation.253 
The importance of these two types of factual findings-bad 
employee behavior and poor performance-is not surprising. 
Scholars have documented that  a typical reaction of employers to 
retaliation suits by whistleblowers is to attack the whistleblowers' 
behavior.254 In  fact, by definition, a whistleblower in a retaliation 
lawsuit suffered some sort of adverse employment action that  the 
employer must j ~ s t l f y . ~ ~ ~  
But, OSHA rarely utilized other possible evidentiary facts in  
support of its decisions, or a t  least OSHA failed to discuss additional 
facts in its decision letters. For example, in these causation 
rationale cases, OSHA's decision letters rarely discussed witness 
credibility (4.6%), the timing of the adverse action in relation to 
the protected activity (5.6%), or whether the employer followed 
its normal procedures in disciplining the employee (3.7%).256 
Furthermore, OSHA decisions only occasionally discussed whether 
the employer claimed to treat the whistleblowers similarly to the 
rest of its employees (15.7%) or whether the employee's discharge 
occurred as  part of a reduction-in-force (11.1%).~~~ OSHA's heavy 
reliance on the employee's behavior in justifying its decision, while 
underutilizing other potential evidence related to a n  employer's 
actions and policies, seems to support the conclusion that  OSHA did 
not fully investigate and evaluate both sides of the disputes 
analyzed. OSHA seemed merely to accept the employer's position, 
perhaps because the employee was not as  involved in the investiga- 
tion. 
By comparison, employees may have won causation cases at the 
AU Level more frequently than a t  the OSHA Level because ALJs 
have the luxury of hearing full testimony from both sides, complete 
with demeanor evidence of witnesses and cross-examination.258 For 
253. See id. 
254. See, e.g., Bruce D.  Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for 
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 364 (1991). 
255. See supra Part I.A. 
256. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or A U s  to support 
a decision for an employer can be found at Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.M. 
257. See id. 
258. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
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example, witness credibility played a n  important role a t  the A M  
Level in cases analyzed by this study, while this factor was almost 
irrelevant a t  the OSHA Level; in 75% of the "causation rationale" 
cases won by the employer a t  the ALJ Level, ALJs relied on the 
credibility of the witnesses to make a decision, a s  compared to 4.6% 
a t  the OSHA Similarly, in all five employee wins resulting 
from a n  ALJ hearing, the ALJ cited "witness credibility" as  a factor 
in deciding in favor of the employee.260 Only 41.7% of the OSHA 
employee wins recognized this factor as  important in OSHA's 
decision.261 
4. Conclusion: Narrow Boundaries and a High Burden 
The results of the present study indicate that OSHA and the 
ALJs failed to fulfill employees' expectations of broad protections in 
the initial years after the Act's enactment.262 Employers consistently 
won Sarbanes-Oxley cases because OSHA and the ALJs found that 
employees failed to present claims within the legal parameters of 
the 
Part  of the explanation for this low win rate could be that 
employees filed frivolous or borderline claims that  clearly did not 
fall within the Act's boundaries.264 This explanation suggests that  
the employee win rate should increase as  employees and their 
attorneys learn from these outcomes and file fewer cases requiring 
a broad reading of the Act. The use of procedural and boundary 
259. See Moberly, Basic Data, supm note 135, a t  tb1.M. I t  is important to remember that 
the total number of causation rationale cases a t  the ALJ Level is quite small. 
260. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to support 
a decision for an  employee can be found a t  Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t  tbl.1. 
261. See id. 
262. See supra Part IIIA. 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 159-68; see also Table 4 supm. 
264. Indeed, to explain the low employee win rate, OSHA posited the theory that early 
Sarbanes-Oxley employees pushed the outer boundaries of the Act. See Discussion with 
Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance (Oct. 3,2006); E-mail from Nilgun 
Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author (July 11, 2005) (on file with 
author); cf Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t  258-65 (exploring this thesis with data from 
ADA appellate cases); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard 
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 567 (2001) (asserting that claims on the "outer perimetern of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act may "represent a natural evolution of a new and innovative 
statute that left much room for interpretation"). 
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rationales should decrease and causation rationales involving 
factual disputes should increase as  attorneys and employees 
determine where administrative decision makers draw the parame- 
ters of the Act. 
However, the study's results contradict these predictions. During 
the course of the study, procedural and boundary rationales did not 
decrease over time. In fact, a s  seen in Chart 2, infra, the trend a t  
the OSHA Level was to resolve increasingly more cases over time by 
using boundary rationales, perhaps following the lead of the ALJs. 
With regard to the AUs ,  Chart 3, infra, demonstrates that there 
was no discernable decline in the use of either procedural or 
boundary rationales over time. 
Moreover, recent statistics provided by OSHA demonstrate that 
no employee won any of the 159 cases that OSHA resolved during 
Fiscal Year 2006, which ended on September 30, 2 0 0 6 . ~ ~ ~  This lack 
of employee victories four years after the Act's enactment suggests 
explanations other than a stubborn insistence by employees and 
their attorneys to file frivolous claims. Indeed, the study demon- 
strates that  OSHA and the ALJs particularly focused on two new 
legal boundaries to whistleblower law implemented by Sarbanes- 
Oxley: a new definition of a "covered employer" and a new type 
of "protected activity." Qualitative evidence from ALJ decisions 
regarding these topics demonstrate that  ALJs often interpreted 
these new boundaries narrowly.266 All of these results suggest that, 
even if employees filed some cases requiring a broad reading of the 
Act, OSHA and the ALJs also contributed to the low employee win 
rate by strictly construing the legal boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Such discrepancies between a whistleblower's expectations regard- 
ing the Act's applicability and how the Act actually was applied 
likely caused a substantially lower win rate than might otherwise 
be expected.267 
265. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author). 
266. See supra Parts III.B.2.b. III.B.2.c. 
267. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 590 ("[Alnother type of powerful 
explanation of aberrant win rates is the parties' mutual misperceptions about the prevailing 
standard of decision."). 
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Moreover, even for cases that  did fall within the strict boundaries 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, OSHA failed to fulfill employees' expectations for 
protection based upon the Act's employee-friendly burden of proof 
for causation. Employers won almost 90% of these "causation" cases 
in front of OSHA, indicating that  OSHA failed to properly apply the 
Act's burden-shifting  requirement^.^^' OSHA seemed more willing 
than the U s  to delve into messy factual issues involving causa- 
tion, but when OSHA did evaluate the causation elements of a case, 
employees rarely 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
An employee who files a Sarbanes-Oxley claim faces a steeper 
uphill battle than most employees asserting claims against a n  
employer under comparable employee ~ ta tu tes .~"  Simply put, this 
study's results suggest that  Sarbanes-Oxley does not protect 
employee whistleblowers to the extent Congress envisioned when it 
passed the Act. This Part  presents three suggestions to remedy this 
underenforcement of a statute that  Congress intended to provide 
broad remedial relief and encouragement to whistleblowers. 
First, Congress should increase the Act's statute of limitations 
from 90 to a t  least 180 days. Second, Congress should address 
OSHA's and the U s '  emphasis on "boundary" issues by clarrfylng 
the breadth of application that  Congress intended for the Act. Third, 
Congress should attend to OSHA's inappropriate application of 
Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burden of proof, either by giving 
OSHA more resources to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley complaints 
thoroughly or by eliminating OSHA's role as  principal investigator 
of these claims. 
Finally, this Part  recommends further research regarding 
whether the faults in Sarbanes-Oxley highlighted by this study 
suggest that  Congress should implement even broader whistle- 
blower protections. 
268. See Table 8 supra. 
269. See supra Part III.B.3. 
270. See discussion supra Part 1II.A (comparing win rates with other employment statutes); 
see also Table 2 supra. 
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A. Amending the Statute of Limitations Procedural Hurdle 
The study's results indicate that OSHA and U s  denied large 
numbers of whistleblowers Sarbanes-Oxley protection because of the 
restrictive 90-day statute of limitations.271 Often, a slightly longer 
limitations period would have mattered: in almost half of the ALJ 
statute of limitations cases (46.4%, or 13 out of 28 cases), employees 
filed Sarbanes-Oxley claims between 90 and 180 days after an  
adverse action.272 These results highlight a n  unnecessary procedural 
obstacle for employees.273 
A longer filing period would enable OSHA or a n  ALJ to hear the 
merits of many of these claims. Moreover, most employees who filed 
Sarbanes-Oxley claims alleged that they lost their j ~ b s . ~ ~ ~ A d d i t i o n a l  
time to file claims would provide whistleblowers the ability to first 
take care of other, more pressing responsibilities, such as  finding 
another job and dealing with the upheaval of losing a primary 
source of income. Furthermore, more than 90 days should be 
provided for a whistleblower to locate a competent attorney and for 
the attorney to investigate a claim thoroughly before filing with the 
Department of Labor. 
A longer limitations period would also ameliorate the drastic 
consequences resulting from any confusion regarding the beginning 
of the limitations period. Such confusion may result from the well- 
enforced rule that  the statute of limitations begins running when 
the employee has notice of a n  adverse action, rather than when the 
action o c c ~ r s ~ ~ ~ - a  rule that can lead to disputes regarding when 
such notice was received and whether the notice was clear. Disputes 
about notice seem more likely when the limitations period is shorter 
because the few days or weeks between notice and a n  actual adverse 
271. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
272. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 2006-SOX-56, a t  2 (AW May 8,2006) (filed 
95 days after adverse action); Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 2006-SOX-48, a t  3 (ALJ Apr. 7, 
2006) (filed 92 days after adverse action). OSHA decisions either did not contain these data 
or, if a decision did indicate the number of days between the retaliation and the filing, OSHA 
redacted those data under an  exception to the Freedom of Information Act. 
273. Of course, i t  is not known how many whistleblowers experienced retaliation but never 
filed because the limitations period had expired before they realized they might have a 
remedy. 
274. The study found that 81.8% (3781462) of complainants whose allegation regarding 
retaliation was discernable alleged that they were fired from their jobs a s  retaliation. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73. 
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employment action become crucial with a shorter statute of 
limitations. 
Lengthening the statute of limitations should not negatively 
impact the ability of an  employer to defend itself. Many employ- 
ment statutes have limitations periods of 180 days or more, and 
employers have not had difficulty marshalling evidence to defend 
themselves.276 In fact, various federal statutes require most em- 
ployers to keep certain records on employees for one year or more, 
resulting in the typical practice of maintaining a n  employee's file for 
a t  least this period of time.277 
No compelling rationale for a 90-day limitations period appears 
in the literature on labor relations, employee rights, or whistleblow- 
ing. In fact, the original version of Sarbanes-Oxley contained a 180- 
day statute of limitations.278 When the Senate Judiciary Committee 
considered the original bill, Senators Grassley and Leahy offered an  
amendment, apparently to mollify a group of Republican senators.279 
The amendment weakened a number of key whistleblower provi- 
sions, including reducing the statute of limitations to 90 days.2s0 
Although the shorter limitations period may have been a necessary 
political compromise, the period's short duration undermines the 
276. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 706(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-5(e)(l) 
(2000) (300 days if charge is first instituted with state or local agency; otherwise 180 days); 
Americans With Disabilities Act 3 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 3 12117(a) (2000) (incorporating Title 
VII's statute of limitations); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 3 7(d), 29 U.S.C. 3 626(d) 
(2000) (either 180 or 300 days if state law provides relief for age discrimination); Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 3 255 (2000) (two or three years, depending on employer intent); 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. $31105(b) (2000) (180 days); Pipeline Safety 
Improvement Act of 2002,49 U.S.C. 3 60129@)(1) (Supp. I1 2002) (180 days). The Government 
Accountability Project (GAP) suggests that a "realistic" statute of limitations is an essential 
provision for an anti-retaliation statute to provide true protection for whistleblowers. See 
Testimony of Tom Devine, Legal Dir., Gov't Accountability Project, for the Working Group on 
Probity and Pub. Ethics, Org. of Am. States (Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.oas.org/ 
juridico/english/tom-devine.htm. Specifically, the GAP suggests that a "one year statute of 
limitations is consistent with common law rights and has proved functional." Id. 
277. See 29 C.F.R. 3 1602.14 (2006) (EEOC regulation requiring employers to maintain 
certain employment records for a t  least one year); 29 C.F.R. 3 516.5 (2006) (Department of 
Labor regulation requiring employers to maintain payroll and other wage records for three 
years). 
278. See 148 CONG. REC. 27, 1789-90 (2002). 
279. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t  22, 26 (2002) (indicating the group of senators to include 
Senators Hatch, Thurmond, Grassley, Kyl, DeWine, Sessions, Brownback, and McConnell). 
280. See id. a t  22, 26. 
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Act's goals of deterring corporate fraud and remedying retaliation 
against whistleblowers. 
A statute of limitations is obviously necessary; however, whistle- 
blowers have been prevented from asserting potentially valid claims 
because this procedural requirement is too restrictive. Given the 
complex nature of these cases, and the reluctance of OSHA, AUs ,  
and the ARB to consider equitable relief from the requirements of 
the statute of limitations, Congress should amend Sarbanes-Oxley 
to provide for a limitations period of a t  least 180 days. 
B. Clarifying the Act's Boundaries 
The study's results also indicate that  the administrative review 
process focused intensely on the legal boundaries of a Sarbanes- 
Oxley claim.281 Administrative decision makers particularly con- 
centrated on two '%oundary" issues: the "covered employer" and the 
"protected activity" requirements for a prima facie case.282 These 
decision makers interpreted each of these provisions in ways that  
overly restricted whistleblower claims. To address this administra- 
tive scrutiny, Congress should amend Sarbanes-Oxley to clarify the 
Act's boundaries in a t  least three specific ways. First, Congress 
should clarify the extent to which certain privately held companies 
are "covered employers" because of their connection to publicly 
traded companies. Second, Congress should reemphasize the broad 
scope of protected activity that Sarbanes-Oxley protects. Third, 
Congress should require the agencies administering the Act to 
provide more information to the public regarding their decision- 
making processes for whistleblower cases. 
1. Clarifying the Definition of a "Covered Employer" 
ALJs and the ARB strictly construed the definition of "covered 
employer." First, a s  discussed above,283 ALJs and the ARB imposed 
onerous requirements for employees to bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims 
against privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. For 
281. See Table 5 supra. 
282. See supra Part 1II.B. 
283. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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example, under some decisions, employees must pierce the corporate 
veil in order to bring a claim against a privately held s u b ~ i d i a r y . ~ ~  
Yet, this requirement ignores the law's treatment of subsidiaries a s  
"agents" of publicly traded companies for accounting and financial 
reporting purposes.28s Subsidiaries "are a n  integral part of the 
publicly traded company, inseparable from it for purposes of 
evaluating the integrity of its financial information, and they must 
be treated a s  A parent company's internal corporate 
controls must include ,providing a subsidiary's material financial 
information to the parent company's officers, who are required to 
certify the parent's annual or quarterly reports.287 For Sarbanes- 
Oxley purposes, a t  least, a "publicly traded corporation is ... the sum 
of its constituent units," including any privately held subsidiaries.288 
Thus, concluded one ALJ, "the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblow- 
er  protection tracks the flow of financial and accounting information 
throughout the corporate structure and remains a s  permeable to 
the internal 'corporate veils' a s  the financial information itself."289 
By contrast, other ALJ decisions and the ARB'S recent opinion 
requiring the piercing of the corporate veil seem misguided in  light 
of this persuasive reasoning equating whistleblower protection with 
other corporate reporting reforms enacted by S a r b a n e s - O ~ l e y . ~ ~ ~  
284. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
285. See Morefield v. Exelon Sews., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t  2 (ALJ Jan. 28,2004). 
286. Id. 
287. See id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 9 302(a)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(B) 
(Supp. I11 2003)). 
288. Id. a t  3. As put by one ALJ in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case: 
The publicly traded entity is not a free-floating apex. When its value and 
performance [are] based, in part, on the value and performance of component 
entities within its organization, the statute ensures that those entities are 
subject to internal controls applicable throughout the corporate structure, that 
they are subject to the oversight responsibility of the audit committee, and that 
the officers who sign the financials are aware of material information relating 
- - 
to the subsidiaries. A publicly traded corporation is, for Sarbanes-Oxley 
purposes, the sum of its constituent units; and Congress insisted upon accuracy 
and integrity in financial reporting a t  all levels of the corporate structure, 
including the non-publicly traded subsidiaries. In this context, the law 
recognizes a s  an obstacle no internal corporate barriers to the remedies 
Congress deemed necessary. I t  imposed reforms upon the publicly traded 
company, and through it, to its entire corporate organization. 
Id. 
289. Morefield, 2004-SOX-2, a t  3. 
290. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. 
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Second, ALJs uniformly held that  privately held companies that 
serve as  contractors of publicly traded companies are not "covered 
entities" under Sarbanes-Oxley, and therefore cannot be liable 
under the The ALJs interpreted the Act's language to mean 
that a n  "officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent" of 
a publicly traded company may not retaliate against a n  employee 
of the public company.292 According to the ALJs, the Act's anti- 
retaliation protections do not extend to employees of contractors, 
subcontractors, and agents unless the contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent is itself a public company.293 Based on such a limited interpre- 
tation of the Act's language, ALJs dismissed a number of cases 
without addressing the factual merits of whether an  employee was 
retaliated against for engaging in protected activity.294 
ALJs' unwillingness to apply the Act directly to employees of 
"contractors, subcontractors, and agents" also appears unnecessary 
and contrary to congressional intent. As Professor Robert Vaughn 
has argued, the Act's use of the term "employee" not only could 
mean a n  employee of a public company, but also could include 
coverage for employees of a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a 
public company.295 Professor Vaughn noted that when Congress 
wants to limit the coverage of a whistleblower statute to certain 
employees, it does so very clearly.296 For example, the AIR21 statute 
(on which much of Sarbanes-Oxley's procedural requirements are 
based) specifically refers to discrimination against "airline employ- 
ees," while Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain such a n  express 
limitation.297 
A prominent whistleblower advocate made a similar argument 
for a broad reading of "covered employer" to include non-publicly 
traded corporations that  have a contractual or agency relationship 
with publicly traded corporations. Stephen Kohn of the National 
Whistleblower Center asserted that  this interpretation "is consis- 
291. See Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006-SOX-11, at 9-10 (ALJ Jan. 10,2006); 
Minkina v. Affiliated Physician's Group, 2005-SOX-19, at 6 (ALJ Feb. 22, 2005); Roulett v. 
Am. Capital Access, 2004-SOX-78, at 9 (ALJ Dec. 22,2004). 
292. See cases cited id. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 9. 
296. See id. 
297. See id. 
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tent with the case law developed under other whistleblower laws."298 
Specifically, under the Energy Reorganization Act, ALJs found 
suppliers and vendors of formally covered companies to be covered 
employers.299 
A broader interpretation also furthers Sarbanes-Oxley's policy 
goals. Professor Vaughn astutely noted that a n  employee of a 
contractor can be "well placed to discover fraud and abuse by the 
[public] company" and public companies should not be able to 
pressure contractors, subcontractors, or agents to "retaliate against 
this employee."300 Although Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative deci- 
sion makers have not interpreted the Act in this manner, a reason- 
able interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley's language is that  Congress 
wanted to protect employees of these contractors, subcontractors, 
and agents, given the role of such employees in "enabling or con- 
doning corruption and fraud."301 Accordingly, Congress should 
amend the Act to clarify that employees of companies that  have 
contractual relationships with publicly traded companies are also 
protected as  whistleblowers when they report activities related to 
fraud a t  publicly traded companies. 
2. Clarifying the Scope of "Protected Activity" 
The Act's coverage of "protected activities" also could be broadly 
construed. The statutes that  the Act identifies as  proper subjects 
for whistleblower disclosures cover a particularly broad swath of 
activities. The criminal code provisions identified by Sarbanes-Oxley 
as  topics for protected whistleblower disclosures "include some of 
the broadest and most widely used provisions of the federal criminal 
law."302 The protection of disclosure related to conduct that  violates 
"any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
... may permit the coverage of some disclosures not clearly encom- 
passed by a purely economic definition of materiality under the 
298. KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, at 70. 
299. Id. at 70 n.3 (citing In re Five Star Prods., Inc., 38 N.R.C. 169,179-80 (1993)). 
300. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 10. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 22 (citing 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. I1 2002), which refers to sections 1341, 
1343, 1344 and 1348 of Title 18 of the United States Code). 
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securities laws."303 Furthermore, by protecting "any" law "relating 
to" fraud against shareholders, the Act protects disclosures about 
not only securities laws, but also "any other federal law that  relates 
to the ability of shareholders to protect themselves against fraud, 
such as  the Foreign Corrupt Practices In other words, a s  
Professor Vaughn argues, whistleblower disclosures about matters 
"well beyond accounting f r a u d  should be protected,306 including: 
disclosures of misconduct as diverse as health and safety 
violations, the suppression of information regarding product 
risks, environmental misconduct, consumer fraud, false claims 
against the government, disregard of statutes requiring the 
disclosure of information to federal regulatory agencies, viola- 
tions of federal anti-discrimination laws, violations of statutes 
and rules protective of labor, conspiracies to break the antitrust 
laws, [and] bribery of public officials, including foreign officials, 
and human rights abuses.306 
Recent ARB decisions, however, rejected a broad interpretation 
and reinforced the U s '  narrow readings of "protected activity," 
thus likely making the road steeper for future whistle blower^.^^^ 
First, the ARB required a whistleblower's disclosure to "definitely 
and specifically" relate to the listed categories of fraud or securities 
violations under 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a)(l) .~~~ In Platone v. FLYi, Inc., 
the ARB interpreted the Act to mean that whistleblower disclosures 
regarding mail or wire fraud were insufficient, by themselves, to 
constitute "protected activity"; rather, the ARB read into the Act a 
requirement that  the fraudulent conduct reported also specifically 
had to 'be of a type that  would be adverse to investors' interests."309 
This additional requirement does not appear in the Act's statutory 
303. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. I1 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
304. See id. a t  23. 
305. See id. a t  46. 
306. See id. a t  23. 
307. I t  should be noted that, a s  of July 15,2007, the ARB has reversed the ALJ in all three 
cases i t  has reviewed in which the employee won a t  the ALJ level. See Welch v. Cardinal 
Bankshares Corp., No. 05-065, a t  2 (ARB May 31,2007); Platone v. FLYi, Inc., No. 04-154, a t  
2 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006); Getman v. Sw. Sec. Inc., No. 04-059, a t  1 (ARB July 29,2005). 
308. See Platone, No. 04-154, a t  17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
309. Id. a t  15. 
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language, which seems to protect the disclosure of any mail or wire 
fraud, not just fraud related to shareholders.310 In fact, the ARB's 
position directly contradicts the holding of a t  least one federal court 
that did not impose this additional req~irement .~"  At least one 
subsequent ALJ opinion has sided with the ARB's narrow reading 
of the "protected activity" requirement.312 
Second, in a different case, the ARB specifically found that  a 
"mere possibility that  a challenged practice could adversely affect 
the financial condition of a corporation, and that  the effect on the 
financial condition could in turn be intentionally withheld from 
investors, is not enough" to satisfy the "protected activity" require- 
ment.313 The ARB also seemed to require, a t  the time a whistleblow- 
er  makes a disclosure, that  the whistleblower specifically identify 
the statute violated by the activities the whistleblower reports and 
connect the statute to Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions.314 Yet, the 
assumption that  rank-and-file employees would have such specific 
and detailed legal knowledge is unwarranted. 
Third, the ARB limited the Act's "protected activity" requirement 
by qualifying Sarbanes-Oxley's mandate that the employee whistle- 
blower "reasonably believe" that  the corporate activity disclosed 
violated one of the named statutes. In Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, 
the ARB indicated that  a "reasonable belief' that  a statute has 
been violated meant a high certainty that the law had been 
broken.315 In that  case, the employee alleged that  she examined 
"internal consolidated financial statements" and that  these state- 
ments indicated that  the company violated an  SEC rule.316 The 
ARB, however, found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule 
violation was not protected because these internal reports did not 
have to be filed with the SEC, and therefore could not have violated 
310. See 18 U.S.C. 9 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004). 
311. See Reyna v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-39(CDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42112, 
a t  *46-53 (M.D. Ga. June 11,2007). 
312. See Deremer v. Gulfmark Offshore, Inc., 2006-SOX-2, a t  48-49 (AU June 29,2007). 
313. Harvey v. Home Depot, No. 04-114, a t  15 (ARB June 2,2006); see also Platone, No. 04- 
154, a t  22 (finding that a reasonable shareholder would not find the potential loss of $1500 
to be "material," and therefore holding that a whistleblower who reported such a loss would 
not be protected under the Act). 
314. See Allen v. Stewart Enters., No. 06-081, a t  12 (ARB July 27, 2006); Reddy v. 
MedQuist, No. 04-123, a t  8-9 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005). 
315. See Allen, No. 06-081, a t  14. 
316. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the rule.317 Accordingly, the ARB found that  the employee could not 
have "reasonably believe[dI7' that a violation of the rule occurred.318 
By so doing, the ARB appears to have transformed the "reasonable 
belief' standard into a n  "actually violated standard, which con- 
tradicts the language and intent of the 
Fourth, in Getman v. Southwest Securities, the ARB determined 
that refusing to engage in illegal activity is not protected activity 
under the In  July 2005, the ARB reversed an  AU decision in 
favor of a n  employee who alleged that she refused to engage in a n  
illegal activity-hanging a stock rating.321 The ARB found that  
merely refusing to break the law, rather than affirmatively 
reporting violations of the law to a person with supervisory 
authority, cannot be deemed true whistleblowing protected by the 
Although the ARB acknowledged that "there may be times 
where only refusal is sufficient to provide information," and thus 
would be protected activity, the facts in the case before it did not 
satisfy that  requirement.323 Accordingly, employees who refuse to 
engage in illegal activity must also demonstrate that their refusal 
communicates to a person with supervisory authority that  the 
employer's conduct violates the law.324 
This decision undermines a long tradition of interpreting both 
statutory whistleblower protections and the common law of 
wrongful discharge to protect a n  employee who refuses to engage in  
317. See id. 
318. See id. 
319. A recent ARB case affirms that employees will have a difficult time meeting this 
standard. In  Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Gorp., No. 05-064 (ARB May 31, 2007), the ARB 
found that a chief financial officer was not protected by SOX when he reported accounting 
errors that led his employer to overstate its earnings and complained that the company had 
insufficient internal controls. See id. a t  9-14. Despite an AW finding in favor of the CFO that 
these reports disclosed violations of federal securities laws, the ARB determined that the CFO 
could not reasonably believe the company violated any laws. See id. a t  10-14. The CFO's 
disclosure of the company's violation of generally accepted accounting standards was not 
sa ic ien t  for Sarbanes-Oxley to protect the CFO. Rather, the ARB required the CFO to know 
whether such accounting errors violated the intricacies of federal securities laws and 
presumably to stay silent if the errors were not technically illegal. See id. a t  11-14. 
320. No. 04-059, a t  10 (ARB July 29, 2005). 
321. See id. a t  9-10. 
322. See id. 
323. See id. a t  10. 
324. See id. 
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illegal activity.325 The impact of this decision on employees may 
be significant. In  the study, a substantial number of successful 
employees alleged that  Sarbanes-Oxley protected their refusal to 
engage in illegal activity. Among all employees, only 8.7% (401462) 
made this claim.326 However, considerably more of the successful 
employees made this claim in addition to claiming that  they actually 
provided information about illegal activity to another person: 60.0% 
at the AU Level, and 30.8% a t  the OSHA The ARB'S 
decision in Getman dismantles this avenue of protected whistleblow- 
ing. 
Congress should legislatively reject these ARB holdings limiting 
the breadth of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections. Specifically, Congress 
should amend the Act's language to reject any requirement that  
whistleblower disclosures must specifically relate to securities 
fraud a s  opposed to fraud in general, as  defined by the statutory 
references in the Act. Additionally, to address the ARB holdings 
regarding the legal specificity of a whistleblower disclosure, 
Congress should amend the Act to emphasize that  a n  employee's 
reasonable belief regarding the illegality of a n  activity reported 
should be compared with a n  employee of similar education and 
experience. Finally, the Act should more clearly protect a n  em- 
ployee's refusal to engage in illegal activity by incorporating specific 
language to that  effect in the statutory provisions. 
3. Clarifying the Decision-Making Process 
In addition to clarifying the Act's substantive protections, 
Congress also could require OSHA and the OALJ to provide 
employees more information on the Act's protections and conse- 
325. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 255 (1987) (interpreting the 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act to protect an employee who refused to operate a motor 
vehicle that did not comply with safety regulations); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 
1330, 1330-31 (Cal. 1980) (protecting refusal to participate in illegal price furing scheme); 
Petermann v. In t l  Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396,344 P.2d 25,26-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) 
(protecting refusal to commit perjury); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270,275-76 (W. 
Va. 1978) (protecting refusal to violate a consumer credit code). 
326. Forty out of 462 complainants whose allegations were discernable claimed to have 
refused to engage in illegal activity (8.7%). See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t  tb1.K. 
327. Three out of five successful ALJ complainants (60%) and four out of 13 successful 
OSHA complainants (30.8%) made this claim. See id. 
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quences prior to blowing the whistle. The low employee success rate 
revealed in  this study suggests that whistleblowers and their 
attorneys need more information about their chance of success in  
the administrative process. Statistical data would provide whistle- 
blowers better information with which to weigh the costs and 
benefits of blowing the whistle in the first place. 
Currently, OSHA and the OAW maintain and publish informa- 
tion related to Sarbanes-Oxley complaints under surprisingly 
different standards and policies. OSHA maintains statistics about 
the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints and is willing to release 
them, but only in  response to a specific request.328 By contrast, the 
OALJ stopped keeping and releasing statistics regarding the 
outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley cases in April 2005.329 However, the 
OALJ publishes all ALJ decisions on its website and provides a 
helpful digest of decisions organized by OSHA, on the other 
hand, requires a FOIA request to release individual decision letters 
and does not publish any summary or digest of its decisions.331 
Neither OSHA nor the OALJ has agreed to release complete 
information regarding settlements.332 
For broadest exposure, all information regarding both overall 
statistics and individualized decisions from OSHA and the ALJs 
should be published. Such information could appear on the OSHA 
and OALJ websites, including running totals of the amounts 
awarded to employees and amounts received by employees through 
settlements, in addition to basic information such as the win rate for 
employees. As a point of comparison, the EEOC, the other major 
federal administrative agency that  processes and adjudicates 
employee claims, provides similar statistics on its website, demar- 
cated by year and statute.333 
328. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author 
(Oct. 5, 2006) (on file with author). 
329. See E-mail from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to author (Feb. 15, 
2006) (on fde with author). 
330. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OFADMIN. LAW JUDGES, SARBANES-OXLN ACT (SOX) 
WHISTLEBLOWER DIGEST, http:/lwww.oalj.dol.govlPUBLIClWHISTLEBLOWERl 
REFERENCESt'REFERENCE-WORKSISOX-DIGEST.HTh4 (last visited Sept. 22,2007). 
331. See OSHA, supra note 250,s 1I.C. 
332. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir. of the Directorate of Enforcement Programs, 
OSHA, to author (Nov. 6,2006) (on file with author); Letter from John M. Vittone, Chief ALJ, 
and Andrea Thomas, FOIA Coordinator, to author (Feb. 12,2007) (on file with author). 
333. See EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http:llwww.eeoc.govlstats/ 
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If OSHA and the ALJs made these statistics readily available for 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases, the statistics could dispel the popular (and 
possibly administrative) opinion that the Act is overly protective of 
employees. To the extent that administrative decision makers view 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases with skepticism because of the Act's poten- 
tially dramatic applicability to millions of employees, these decision 
makers may have a tendency to read the Act narrowly in order to 
avoid a "flood" of litigants. Statistical information about the 
overwhelming advantage employers have in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
claims process may have a substantive impact on decision makers, 
who may reevaluate such inclinations. Additionally, this public 
exposure may also limit any decision maker bias toward a particular 
party. 
With regard to substantive, a s  opposed to statistical, information, 
OSHA could follow the OALJ's lead and post its decision letters 
online for public inspection. OSHA could also update and publish 
any guidance it gives to its field investigators regarding OSHA's 
approach to the unique Sarbanes-Oxley issues addressed in this 
Article, such as  OSHA's interpretation of the "covered employeryy 
and "protected activity" requirements. Other agencies make similar 
information publicly available; for example, the EEOC publishes a 
detailed Compliance Manual and updated Enforcement Guidances 
describing the standards used by the EEOC when evaluating 
various legal issues.334 Such information would allow for further 
public discourse and transparency regarding OSHA's interpreta- 
tions of these debatable issues. 
These suggestions would impose little administrative cost on the 
government, given that OSHA and the OALJ already maintain 
much of the information. Moreover, this information may convince 
employees with marginal claims not to assert them. Weak claims 
may have led to stronger than necessary language in decisions 
construing the Act narrowly.335 This narrowing language is problem- 
atic because of its applicability to later cases in which a broader 
enforcement.htm1 (last visited Sept. 22,2007). 
334. See EEOC, Compliance Manual, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html (last 
visited Sept. 22,2007); EEOC, Enforcement Guidances and Related Documents, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/policy/guidance.html (last visited Sept. 22,2007). 
335. Cf. Selmi, supra note 264, at 567-68 (discussing this problem in the context of the 
ADA). 
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interpretation might have been appropriate. A stronger overall pool 
of employee-complainants may help convince decision makers that  
a slightly broader view of the Act is appropriate to satisfy Sarbanes- 
Oxley's remedial aims with only a minimal risk of opening the 
floodgates for frivolous claims. 
C. Enforcing the Burden of Proof 
Unlike the unclear scope of some of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal 
boundaries, Sarbanes-Oxley mandates a n  unambiguously employee- 
friendly burden of proof for claims that fall within the Act's 
protections. As discussed above, employees have a low burden 
because the employee must only prove causation under a "contribut- 
ing factoryy test.336 Conversely, Sarbanes-Oxley places a high burden 
on employers, who must prove their rebuttal under a "clear and 
convincing" standard.337 ~ h u s ,  a reasonable expectation when the 
case focuses on a causation dispute would be that, absent significant 
case selection effects, Sarbanes-Oxley should produce a higher than 
average win rate for employees. Indeed, ALJ decisions met this 
expectation, a s  employees won 66.7% of the time when "causation" 
was the issue, and 88.3% of the time when the employer was 
required to satisfy the "clear and convincing" burden of proof.338 
But, despite having every advantage regarding the burden of 
proof for causation, employees still lost a t  an  extremely high rate a t  
the OSHA Level, even when the only issue was causation. OSHA 
found that a n  employee satisfied the "contributing factory' standard 
only 30.6% of the time.339 When the employee met this level of proof, 
placing a "clear and convincing" burden of proof on the employer 
still resulted in a relatively low employee win rate of 35.1%.~~' 
Overall in these "causation" cases, employees won only 10.7% of the 
time a t  the OSHA Level, compared to 55.6% of the time a t  the ALJ 
336. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
337. See id. 
338. See Tables 9 and 10 supra. 
339. See Table 9 supra. 
340. See Table 10 supra. 
341. See Table 8 supra. 
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This problem presents no easy solution. The statutory language 
already sets forth the favorable burden of proof for employees 
unambiguously, so further legislative change to the burden of 
proof seems unhelpful. OSHA itself appears unable or unwilling to 
implement Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burdens. 
To the extent OSHA is willing but unable to perform this task, 
Congress should provide OSHA with more resources to investigate 
and to adjudicate Sarbanes-Oxley claims adequately. A fuller 
investigation and more information from employees may increase 
the likelihood of employee success a t  the OSHA Level. To provide a 
fuller investigation-one that is more "hearing-like"-Congress 
should provide OSHA subpoena power in  its Sarbanes-Oxley 
investigations, similar to the authority OSHA employs to enforce 
the Occupational Safety and Health Additionally, OSHA 
should amend its regulations to provide itself more authority for 
information gathering.343 Altering OSHA's policies and regulations 
to ensure more employee participation in the process may present 
OSHA with more complete information about the factual circum- 
stances of a case.344 
For example, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), which 
protects federal government employees who report waste, misman- 
agement, or wrongdoing, takes a different approach than the 
current OSHA regulations. When the Office of Special Counsel 
investigates a whistleblower's complaint against a federal agency, 
the WPA permits the whistleblower to comment upon the agency's 
answer to the whistleblower's complaint after it is submitted to 
342. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (2000) (granting OSHA subpoena power when OSHA 
investigates possible safety and health problems). 
343. As part of this overhaul, OSHA should also highlight Sarbanes-Oxley's unique burden 
of proof structure in its investigative manual and better differentiate Sarbanes-Oxley from 
other whistleblower statutes OSHA administers. 
344. See Robert G. Vaughn et  al., The Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organization 
ofAmerican States and the Global Legal Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. 
INTL L. REV. 857, 864 (2003) (asserting that a model whistleblower law should include 
provisions enabling whistleblowers to be "involved in the administrative process regarding 
evaluation of their allegations and regarding petitions for protection or redress," including 
being given opportunities "to respond or to provide additional information"); see also Valerie 
J. Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique 
60 (Oct. 3, 2006) (Express0 Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 1822), available a t  
http:/llaw.bepress.com/expresso/epsll822. 
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the Special This statutorily mandated back-and-forth 
exchange provides the Special Counsel with a more complete picture 
of the factual background to the case. Similarly, a broader picture 
may give OSHA's investigators the proper context with which to 
apply the appropriate employee-friendly burden of proof.346 In fact, 
in April 2006, OSHA amended its procedures to require that an  
employee receive "at least the substance" of the employer's response 
to a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint.347 Additionally, other evidence from 
the employer, or a t  least the "substance" of such evidence, ''may" 
also be disclosed to the employee.348 Although these changes are an  
improvement, OSHA still fails to require that  the employee receive 
the employer's actual response and other evidence presented by the 
employer, and also fails to unambiguously permit the employee to 
comment upon and respond to the employer's submissions. Without 
such full disclosure and opportunity to participate, the employee 
will have a difficult time fully presenting a case of retaliation and 
responding to the employer's version of the events. 
To the extent OSHA's failure is one of will, merely increasing 
OSHA's authority and resources may not be sufficiently drastic to 
respond to the agency's failure to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley ade- 
quately. Rather, it may be necessary to remove OSHA entirely from 
this role. In fact, from the Act's inception, OSHA seemed like a n  
unlikely choice to investigate corporate whistleblower claims.349 
Although the agency administers thirteen other whistleblower 
provisions, the type of corporate fraud a t  issue in Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases seems far removed from the worker safety and health issues 
addressed by many of the other statutes under OSHA's purview.350 
At least three other options may serve the Act's, and whistleblow- 
345. See 5 U.S.C. $ 1213(e)(l) (2000). 
346. Cf. Vaughn et  al., supra note 344, a t  864 (noting that involvement of whistleblowers 
in the administrative process "not only reassures whistleblowers but also increases the 
efficiency of the administrative process"). 
347. See OSHA, supra note 250. 
348. See id. 
349. See Cherry, supra note 8, a t  1083 n.383; Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three 
Years, 2005 N.Z. L. REV. 365,371 (noting that "Congress delegated enforcement [of Sarbanes- 
Oxley] to safety and health regulators unsophisticated in financial fraud rather than to 
securities regulators"); Solomon, supra note 243. 
350. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c) (2000); 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. $ 31105 (2000); see also Solomon, 
supra note 243 (noting that OSHA had to hand out books on securities laws to investigators). 
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ers', interests better than keeping investigative responsibility with 
OSHA. 
Two of these options entail providing more formalized hearing 
procedures to whistleblowers in the first instance, without requiring 
employees to jump through the hoops of a n  administrative investi- 
gation. First, Congress could eliminate the statutory 180-day 
waiting period before a whistleblower can file a claim in federal 
court. Indeed, a n  early draft of Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower 
protections did not contain this waiting period and permitted 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers to file directly in federal At 
least one other anti-retaliation provision that  protects "financial" 
whistleblowers-specifically, employees of depository institutions 
and federal banks who report illegal conduct-permits direct filing 
of anti-retaliation claims in federal Federal courts may be 
more willing and able to apply Sarbanes-Oxley's shifting burdens of 
proof correctly.353 If so, then removing the 180-day waiting period 
would enable whistleblowers to avoid OSHA's procedural unfairness 
and choose the federal forum immediately. 
Second, if direct filing in federal court overly burdens a n  already- 
crowded federal docket, employees could be permitted to bypass 
the OSHA investigation and obtain a n  ALJ hearing directly. ALJs 
currently review Sarbanes-Oxley cases de novo after a n  OSHA 
investigation and without deference to OSHA's  determination^.^^^ 
To the extent OSHA currently filters cases with little or no merit, 
ALJs could perform this same function with orders to show cause, 
motions to dismiss, and motions for summary judgment. Indeed, the 
study demonstrates that AUs regularly decided cases based on pre- 
hearing legal arguments regarding the applicability of Sarbanes- 
Oxley to an  employee's claims.355 The advantage of sending cases 
351. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at'22.26 (2002). The waiting period was added a s  part of a 
compromise with the same group of Republican senators that reduced the statute of 
limitations from 180 days to 90 days. See supm notes 278-79 and accompanying text. 
352. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,12 U.S.C. 
$ 1831j (2000). 
353. To determine the accuracy of this speculation, I am currently collecting and analyzing 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed in federal courts. 
354. See 29 C.F.R. $ 1980.107(b) (2006). 
355. The study found that ALJs decided 67 of 93 cases (72%) without a factual hearing, 
based primarily on motion practice. A complete table setting forth the results regarding the 
resolution of ALJ cases by hearing or motion can be found a t  Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 
135, a t  tb1.L. 
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directly to the OALJ would be that, when the facts are in dispute, 
ALJs have demonstrated the ability and willingness to apply the 
burdens of proof in the employee-friendly manner in which Congress 
intended.356 
Finally, to the extent a n  initial administrative investigation has 
value, shifting initial investigative responsibility to a different 
administrative agency represents a third option. One possible 
alternative investigatory body is the SEC. A whistleblower investi- 
gation by the SEC, with its ongoing concern for corporate fraud, may 
better deter corporate fraud than the threat of any other agency 
investigation. Through Sarbanes-Oxley investigations, the SEC may 
learn information that could lead to charges of securities fraud 
against companies or individual officers, which would have much 
greater deterrence value than the typical whistleblower investiga- 
tion of an  employee complaint. In fact, any violation of Sarbanes- 
Oxley, presumably including the Act's whistleblower provision, 
already should be considered a violation of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, with penalties of up to $1 million in fines and ten years 
in prison.357 Although not currently enforced in this manner, placing 
the SEC in charge of whistleblower investigations might encourage 
the agency to request that  the Department of Justice utilize this 
additional enforcement mechanism to deter retaliation against 
whistleblowers. In short, the SEC seems like a natural choice to 
investigate claims related to shareholder fraud. 
However, this suggestion presents the risk that the SEC may be 
just as  unsympathetic to whistleblowers as  OSHA. Since the Act's 
inception, the SEC has shown little or no interest in whistleblower 
claims. Even though the SEC receives summaries of whistleblower 
allegations filed with OSHA,358 the SEC has not publicly recom- 
mended that the Department of Justice investigate any person 
356. I t  must be remembered, however, that only nine cases made i t  to the "causation" stage 
of an ALJ's decision-making process. Thus, if this suggestion were adopted, then i t  would be 
important to address the U s '  fmation on the Act's procedural and legal boundaries, as 
discussed in the prior two sub-Parts. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-B. 
357. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,s 3(b), 156 U.S.C. $ 7202(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (stating 
that "a violation by any person of th[e Sarbanes-Oxley] Act ... shall be treated for all purposes 
in the same manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... and any such 
person shall be subject to the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a violation of that 
Act"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2000). 
358. See 29 C.F.R. 1980.104(a) (2006). 
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accused of retaliating against a whistleblower. In  2004, two U.S. 
Senators formally requested that the SEC explain whether the SEC 
intended to use its authority to file civil enforcement actions for 
violations of Sarbanes-Oxley in order to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley's 
anti-retaliation provisions.359 The Chairman of the SEC responded 
that  the SEC puts its resources toward "substantive" violations of 
securities laws and therefore would leave Sarbanes-Oxley anti- 
retaliation enforcement to the Department of Labor.360 Yet, despite 
this apparent reluctance to become involved with whistleblower 
claims, a formal congressional mandate for the SEC to enforce 
Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provisions may motivate the 
agency, particularly if whistleblower investigations unveil "substan- 
tive" violations of other securities laws. 
Any of these options could provide better protection for employees 
than maintaining the status quo, which likely fails to deter retal- 
iation against whistleblowers adequately. 
D. Thinking About Broader Protections 
Rigid and narrow interpretations of the Act seem inappropriate 
given the Act's remedial goals and the necessity of employee 
whistleblowers to reveal corporate fraud.361 For some whistleblower 
advocates, a "model" whistleblower statute--one that  maximizes 
encouragement and protection of whistleblowers-should protect a 
broad range of whistleblowers and disclosures.362 Despite the great 
expectations that existed a t  the time of the Act's passage, the 
current interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley do not attain these goals 
because they narrow the scope of protected disclosures and, by 
strictly construing the type of employee covered by the Act, seem to 
focus inordinately on the whistleblower rather than the disclosure 
being made.363 Accordingly, the results of this study raise a question 
359. See Letter from Patrick Leahy and Charles E. Grassley, Senators, to William H. 
Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1 (Nov. 9, 2004) (on file with author). 
360. See Letter from William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n to Patrick 
Leahy and Charles E. Grassley, Senators, a t  3-4 (Dec. 21,2004) (on file with author). 
361. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 1, a t  1116-17 (discussing the importance 
of employees as corporate monitors). 
362. See Vaughn et  al., supra note 344, a t  865 (discussing various provisions of a "modeln 
whistleblower statute). 
363. See id. a t  864 (asserting that a model whistleblower statute should focus on the 
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that  deserves further research: should Congress explicitly protect 
corporate whistleblowers more broadly? Specifically, the strict line- 
drawing problems revealed by the study may indicate that a 
broader, more general whistleblower act may be necessary in order 
to fully protect and encourage whistleblowers. At least two alterna- 
tive types of statutory protections deserve further consideration. 
First, drawing technical distinctions between publicly traded and 
privately held companies in both the subsidiary and contractor 
scenarios likely creates employee confusion regarding whether a 
potential whistleblower will be protected from retaliation. This 
confusion can only lead to inconsistent enforcement of the Act and 
therefore less whistleblower disclosure. At its most dangerous, such 
distinctions provide a free pass for privately held corporations to 
retaliate against any employee who reports internal misconduct. 
Thus, Congress could reconsider whether employee protections 
should hinge on the vagaries of the corporate decision to publicly 
trade its shares. A more commonly utilized distinction in employ- 
ment law is for statutes to cover employers with a definable number 
of employees, such a s  Title VII's 15-employee minimum.364 Indeed, 
Sarbanes-Oxley could achieve similar coverage with less ambiguous 
language by relying on the number of employees as  a proxy for 
publicly traded companies. In order to avoid overly burdening 
employers, Congress could set the number of employees required for 
coverage a t  the same minimum set by the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, which provides the largest minimum of any federal 
employment statute: the FMLA covers employers with fifty or more 
employees within a seventy-five mile radius of a work site.365 This 
requirement would be both over- and underinclusive, in that it 
would exclude small publicly traded companies yet include large 
privately held companies. However, it would provide more certainty 
disclosure made by the whistleblower, not the whistleblower himself). 
364. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Q 701(b), 42 U.S.C. Q 2000e(b) (2000) (15 
employees); see also Americans with Disabilities Act 5 101,42 U.S.C. Q 12111(5)(A) (2000) (15 
employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Q ll(b), 29 U.S.C. Q 630(b) (2000) (20 
employees). I t  should be noted that several whistleblower protections do not require a 
minimum number of employees. Instead, these statutory anti-retaliation provisions protect 
employees from retaliation by any "person," including employers of any size. See, e.g., 
Occupational Safety and Health Act Q ll(c), 29 U.S.C. Q 660(c) (2000). 
365. See 29 U.S.C. Q 2611(2) (2000) (defining eligible employees); id. Q 2611(4) (defining 
covered employers). 
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regarding coverage because employees may better understand this 
criteria commonly utilized by other employee protection statutes. 
Second, the type of disclosure that will be protected likely 
provides another area of confusion for employees, employers, and 
decision makers. Sarbanes-Oxley follows the general federal model 
of using statutory whistleblower protections to protect only certain 
disclosures related to the substantive aims of a particular statute.366 
This federal model will always depend upon difficult line drawing 
as  long as  the aim of whistleblower protection is to encourage only 
whistleblower disclosures regarding specific topics, such a s  fraud or 
workplace safety. By tying the protection an  employee receives to 
whether the employee disclosed information about a "protected" 
topic, federal law puts enormous consequences on the ability of a n  
employee to frame a whistleblower disclosure in the terms pre- 
sented by a specific statute. It also presents a n  easy target for 
employers or administrative decision makers to limit a law's 
coverage by forcing employees to make a n  unreasonably specific 
whistleblowing disclosure or to hold an  unrealistic understanding 
of the law. Sarbanes-Oxley's language is particularly problematic 
because of the broad applicability of the statute across industries as  
compared to other whistleblower provisions that  are aimed a t  
specific industries.367 Additionally, the Act's goal of preventing 
"shareholder f r a u d  appears more ambiguous and open-ended than 
other topics, such as workplace health and safety.368 Furthermore, 
Sarbanes-Oxley's broad language implies that  Congress prefers 
protection for disclosure of a broader range of misconduct, but the 
overall aim of the Act is to prevent shareholder fraud, a point that 
the ARB has used to limit the type of activities the Act protects.369 
Avoiding these line-drawing problems with broader protections 
may be appropriate. California's and New Jersey's whistleblower 
366. Sarbanes-Oxley s p e ~ ~ c a l l y  aims a t  disclosures related to corporate fraud. Other 
examples of such limited federal protection include the Energy Reorganization Act, aimed a t  
disclosures related to nuclear safety, see 42 U.S.C. $ 5851 (2000); the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, aimed a t  disclosures related to workplace safety and health, see 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c) 
(2000); and AIR21, geared toward protecting whistleblowers who report problems with airline 
safety, 49 U.S.C. $ 42121 (2000). 
367. See, e.g., Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 5851 (2000) (aimed a t  the nuclear 
power industry); AIR21,49 U.S.C. $42121 (2000) (aimed a t  airline industry). 
368. Cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) $ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. $ 651(b) (2000). 
369. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
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protection statutes, for example, protect corporate whistleblowers 
who report any illegal activity, such as  a violation of a statute, rule, 
or regulation.370 At the federal level, the National Whistleblower 
Center proposed legislation that would broadly protect corporate 
whistleblowers in the same manner.371 Internationally, model 
statutes developed by whistleblower scholars in conjunction with 
the Office of Legal Cooperation of the Organization of American 
States contain similarly protective provisions,372 as  do statutes 
applicable to private sector employees in Great Britain,373 Canada,374 
and South Given the difficulty employees have had 
penetrating the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley's limited "protected 
activity" requirement, these explicitly broad protections warrant 
further consideration. Although any new definition will have gray 
areas a t  the edges, a n  expansion and simplification of the "protected 
activity" requirement could reduce the tendency among administra- 
tive decision makers to strictly construe whether a whistleblower 
deserves protection based upon the type of disclosure made. 
In sum, the study indicates that  many employee losses resulted 
from the focus of administrative decision makers on issues that 
define the legal boundaries of the Act. To the extent one believes 
that we should encourage substantial numbers of corporate 
employee whistleblowers to report a wide range of misconduct, one 
response to the study's results might be for Congress to provide 
broader whistleblower protections to more clearly protect whistle- 
blowers that  Sarbanes-Oxley excludes--either through its statutory 
language or because of the narrow construction of such language by 
administrative agencies. 
Of course, another view might be that  Congress meant Sarbanes- 
Oxley to address only the problem of corporate fraud in public 
companies; in that  case, the study's results demonstrate that 
administrative decision makers have appropriately enforced the 
370. See CAL. LAB. CODE 3 1102.5 (Deering 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2006). 
371. See National Whistleblower Protection Act proposal, http:llweb.archive.orglwebl 
2 0 0 6 0 2 1 9 0 0 4 3 2 6 l w w w . w h i s t l e b l o w e r s . o r g ~ a w . h t m  (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2007); see also Cherry, supra note 8, at 1170 & n.287, 1121 (recommending the 
proposal from the National Whistleblower Center). 
372. See Vaughn et al., supra note 344, at 859, 865-66. 
373. See id. at 891-92 (discussing the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998). 
374. See id. at 882 (discussing the New Brunswick Employment Standards Act). 
375. See id. at 893-94 (discussing the South African Public Disclosures Act). 
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narrow legal parameters of the Act. Suggestions to broaden 
whistleblower protections inevitably lead to counterarguments that 
these protections extend Sarbanes-Oxley beyond its original focus 
on corporate fraud and that any restriction on a n  employer's ability 
to fire a n  employee will result in higher employer costs.376 In turn, 
these higher employer costs could force lower employee wages or 
higher unemployment. Neither outcome would help employees as a 
Further research should examine whether the benefits of 
broader whistleblower protection would outweigh these inevitable 
costs. 
This study suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley fails to protect employee 
whistleblowers a s  Congress originally intended. The unfulfilled 
expectations of employees regarding the Act's potential protections 
have led to a surprisingly low win rate in claims adjudicated 
administratively under the Act. In particular, two discrepancies 
between employee expectation and administrative implementation 
contributed to the low win rate for employees throughout Sarbanes- 
Oxley's administrative process. 
First, OSHA and the U s  typically found for the employer 
because the employee failed to satisfy the Act's legal hurdles. 
During the initial years of the Act's implementation, employees may 
have brought claims that pushed the boundaries of the Act. 
Administrative decision makers responded by narrowly interpreting 
the Act's provisions, particularly with regard to the procedural bar 
of the statute of limitations and the boundary requirements of a 
prima facie case, including the "covered employer" and "protected 
activity" elements. Because most Sarbanes-Oxley cases were 
resolved through the resolution of legal issues, the causation issues 
surrounding a whistleblower's allegation were rarely adjudicated. 
Second, in instances when the more factual allegations of 
causation were addressed, OSHA tended to apply the Act's 
employee-friendly burden of proof inappropriately. In these cases, 
376. See generally Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard 
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). 
377. See id. 
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OSHA consistently found for the employer, even when the only issue 
was whether the employer satisfied a "clear and convincing" burden 
of proof. 
To address these issues, Congress could make several changes to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. To redress the unfair burdens the Act's 
short statute of limitations imposes on employees, Congress could 
lengthen the limitations period from 90 to a t  least 180 days, which 
would comport with statutes of limitations found in other employ- 
ment laws. 
Additionally, to curb the rigid application of the Act's '%bound- 
aries," Congress could consider clarifying the Act's coverage for 
areas on which OSHA and the U s  appear to focus: the "covered 
employer" requirement and the "protected activity" requirement. 
Clarifying the scope of the Act's coverage would protect employees 
who report wrongdoing, but work for a type of company or report a 
type of misconduct that administrative decision makers currently 
determine to be outside of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections. Congress 
also could require that OSHA and the U s  publicize and report the 
types of findings they make in order to better inform the public of 
the limitations of their decision making. 
Finally, to address OSHA's apparent misapplication of the Act's 
burden of proof, Congress and OSHA could provide employees more 
influence and participation in the investigative process, enabling 
OSHA to consider both sides of the dispute more fully. To supple- 
ment this suggestion, Congress should provide OSHA more 
resources to enable the agency to comprehensively and competently 
administer the increased load of Sarbanes-Oxley cases. Alterna- 
tively, Congress could consider removing OSHA as  the primary 
investigator of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints. Other options are 
available: Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers could file directly in 
federal court or with a n  AW; or, another agency such as  the SEC 
might be able to apply the statute more appropriately. 
Recent corporate scandals powerfully reinforced the notion that 
employees are uniquely positioned to identlfy and to report corpo- 
rate misconduct.378 Employees' internal placement in the corporate 
structure often provides them with better information about 
wrongdoing than external corporate monitors, such as  the govern- 
378. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 1, at 1116-25. 
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ment or outside attorneys and  accountant^.^'^ This monitoring can 
only be effective, however, if the law protects whistleblowers from 
retaliation. Employees will report wrongdoing less frequently unless 
they are given credible assurances that they will be safe from 
retaliation. Unfortunately, during the first years of its existence, 
Sarbanes-Oxley has not sufficiently protected whistleblowers and 
thus cannot provide such assurances. As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley 
requires further congressional and administrative scrutiny in order 
to fulfill Congress's and employees' expectations that employees will 
be protected from retaliation for blowing the whistle on corporate 
malfeasance. 
379. See id. at 1116-17. 
